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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 7, 2009, the Bolivian government formally recognized indigenous 
autonomy through the promulgation of the country’s newest constitution.  The New 
Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Nueva Constitución Política 
del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia) legalizes self-determination for indigenous 
communities, upholding their right to define their own local political, economic and 
judicial systems.  In the following chapters, I frame indigenous autonomy as part of a 
decades-long struggle to deepen democracy in Bolivia through the more meaningful 
inclusion of indigenous peoples and through the decentralization of the country’s political 
system.  The incorporation of the country’s indigenous population into the state system as 
full and equal citizens is especially important to this struggle since 62 percent of 
Bolivia’s population self-identifies as indigenous (Albó and Romero 2009, 2).  The state 
has attempted to achieve this incorporation through decentralizing reforms and through 
the recognition of special collective rights.  However, paradoxically, as these reforms 
seek to draw indigenous peoples closer to the state apparatus, indigenous communities 
have sought to distance themselves increasingly from the central government.  
Indigenous groups have even taken advantage of such reforms to exercise greater 
autonomy from the state.  The result is an increasingly contentious relationship between 
the state democratic system and indigenous political systems. 
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In order to set the stage for my discussion of the state’s recent recognition of 
indigenous autonomy, I will begin with a brief history of indigenous rights and political 
decentralization in Bolivia and how these two realms have interacted each other, 
culminating in demands for indigenous autonomy in recent decades. 
The year 1874 in many ways is a starting point for the historical exclusion of 
Bolivia’s indigenous peoples from the political, economic and social scenes of the 
country.  In 1874, the government of Mariano Melgarejo passed the Ley de Ex-
vinculación.  This law is infamous among Bolivia’s indigenous population for abolishing 
communal land rights, thus destroying the ayllu system.  Communal lands were parceled 
out to community members who received private land titles and, often, subsequently sold 
their lands or lost them to encroaching haciendas.  Thus, the law also marks the birth of 
the hacienda and indigenous peonage.  Furthermore, it represents a significant instance of 
indigenous exclusion from national policymaking, since the ratification of the Law fully 
ignored indigenous opinions.  Since then, indigenous peoples have fought for the return 
of their ancestral lands and communal rights to those territories, as well as for a voice on 
the national political stage.  Until recent decades, however, their efforts have been to little 
avail. 
The year 1952 signified a turning point for indigenous peoples in Bolivia.  In that 
year, the MNR party came to power, commencing the Bolivian National Revolution.  
Indigenous inhabitants were granted suffrage and incorporated into the national political 
system as full citizens.  The Agrarian Reform of 1953, enacted by the MNR, abolished 
the hacienda system, which it labeled as backward and a hindrance to the national 
economy.  Agrarian unions (sindicatos agrarios) were also put in place at this time as a 
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way to organize peasant communities.  In this case, “peasant communities” refers mainly 
to indigenous communities, since the MNR also re-baptized indigenous citizens as 
peasants during the Agrarian Reform, stripping them of their ethnic identity in the hope 
of creating a homogenous Bolivian nation.  Agrarian unions oftentimes overlaid 
indigenous forms of community organization, whereby indigenous leaders were given 
positions within the union or union-appropriate titles that would have corresponded more 
or less with their position in the former indigenous hierarchy.  This has heavily impacted 
modern, indigenous political systems in the Bolivian highlands, especially in Aymara and 
Quechua communities, which now have nearly identical forms of political organization.  
While their intended effect of homogenization may not have been achieved in many 
indigenous communities, the central government hoped that agrarian unions would offer 
some form of local political organization and representation to peasants and, implicitly, to 
indigenous peoples. 
The National Revolution and the Agrarian Reform recognized indigenous peoples 
(in whatever couched terms) as a vital component to a healthy democracy in Bolivia.  
However, these events also resulted in the loss of a formal indigenous ethnic identity and, 
thus, indigenous peoples were not incorporated into the national political system as such.  
They were accepted into the nation as a class, peasants, rather than as an ethnic group.  
This resulted in the masked exclusion of indigenous peoples from the political system 
since they were denied a collective ethnic identity, a common history and special 
communal rights.  Moreover, the economic and social inequality of Bolivia’s indigenous 
citizens persisted as the term “campesino” came to hold many of the same racist 
connotations as the former “indio.”  It was not until the 1970s that indigenous peoples 
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began to reclaim and reconstruct collective indigenous identities.  Then, in the late 1980s, 
indigenous groups across the country began to articulate specific demands for 
autonomous control over their ancestral territories.  The resulting legal reforms have been 
both symbolic and practical in their recognition of indigenous rights and the further 
incorporation of indigenous peoples into the national political system. 
In 1989, demands for indigenous autonomy were made on both the national and 
international stages.  Internationally, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples recognized indigenous peoples’ right 
to “retain their own customs and institutions” (Art. 8).  Within Bolivia, the Confederation 
of Bolivia’s Indigenous Peoples (CIDOB)1 proposed the Ley Indígena that formally 
outlined a plan for special indigenous rights to self-governance and territorial control 
(Albó and Barrios 2009; Plata 2010).  Then, in 1990, CIDOB organized the “March for 
Territory and Dignity,” crossing the country from Trinidad to La Paz, demanding the 
right to autonomous control over indigenous territories (Albó 2008).  In that same year, 
the central government ratified the ILO Convention 169. 
More recently, in 1994, Bolivia began an intensive decentralization process with 
the ratification of the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), the idea being to create a more 
meaningful democratic system by giving citizens greater influence over politics at the 
local level.  Decentralization gave more power to municipal governments so that, in 
theory, political participation might be more effective and government more personalized 
to the needs of each community.  This was the first of several reforms aimed at deepening 
democracy in Bolivia by making citizenship more meaningful for a larger swath of the                                                         
1 CIDOB is an indigenous organization that represents most of Bolivia’s lowland indigenous groups on a 
national level. 
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population.  Though this reform was not focused specifically on improving indigenous 
rights, indigenous communities seized the opportunity to exercise greater autonomy from 
the central government at the municipal level.  Thus, the LPP also marks an important 
milestone in the drive for indigenous autonomy because it “opened a space of 
empowerment for the [indigenous] communities since it implied the emergence of 
indigenous peoples as direct actors in the political arena, widening the notion of 
individual citizenship to collective citizenship” (Plata 2010, 248, author’s translation).  
As an unintended side effect, the Law created new possibilities for indigenous 
communities to practice greater independence from the state. 
The indigenous municipality of Jesús de Machaca declares this historical moment 
as the initial spark of their hope for greater autonomy from the state (CEBEM 2009, 59).  
At the time, Jesús de Machaca was part of the municipality of Viacha, but with the 
extended autonomy offered at the municipal level by the 1994 LPP, the community was 
motivated to petition for separate municipal status, and was eventually granted this in 
2002.  Taking advantage of its newfound autonomy, the community held unofficial 
elections according to customary practices with the intention of formalizing the results in 
the 2004 state-sanctioned municipal elections. 
Though the Law of Popular Participation was effective in decentralizing the 
Bolivian state, it failed to address ethnic differences and dissipate ethnic conflict.  In 
other words, the Law denied special territorial rights for indigenous communities, and 
newly created municipalities grouped indigenous and non-indigenous peoples together 
under the same local government (as was the case with Jesús de Machaca).  Thus, 
CIDOB embarked upon its second march in 1996 for “Territory, Land, Political 
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Participation and Development.”  In response, the 1996 Law of the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (Ley INRA) created the territorial status of First Peoples’ Communal 
Territory (Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen, TCO), constituting an attempt to recognize 
indigenous claims to ancestral lands.  However, TCO status did not grant political 
authority to a territory’s inhabitants and could not fully guarantee territorial control 
(Gustafson 2009a, 995).  Moreover, the 1996 INRA Law’s TCO provision was largely 
directed at Bolivia’s lowland indigenous groups, who often constituted a minority in their 
respective municipalities. 
In Bolivia’s highlands, indigenous peoples constituted a large majority in many of 
the newly created municipalities.  In fact, 145 of Bolivia’s 327 municipalities (44 
percent) have an indigenous population constituting 90 percent or more of their total 
population (Colque 2009a, 90), and all but two of these municipalities are located in the 
highlands (Colque 2009b, 44).  In terms of simple majority, 85 percent of highland 
municipalities are over 50 percent indigenous (Colque 2009b, 43).  Thus, the 1994 LPP 
offered highland groups significant control over their territories (as long as their ancestral 
territory lie within the confines of the state-defined municipality), while lowland groups 
relied on the 1996 INRA Law to provide them with greater autonomy. 
In 1999, the LPP was modified to allow for the creation of “Indigenous 
Municipalities,” which permitted the combination of customary practices of decision-
making with municipal government institutions.  However, the resulting systems of local 
government, largely retained the existing municipal institutions, while indigenous 
practices were often included as an afterthought or were carried out completely separate 
from the municipal government and had little influence over it (Cameron 2009).  Thus, 
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demands for indigenous autonomy continued to be insufficiently addressed by the 
Bolivian state. 
In 2001, organizations representing Bolivia’s Aymara nation laid out their hopes 
and demands in the Achacachi Manifesto, which was released in the midst of massive, 
violent, indigenous uprisings all across Bolivia’s altiplano region, where the Aymara are 
concentrated.  The first of the Manifesto’s six points calls for “the revival of indigenous 
power and of the original nations of this republic dominated by economic, political, and 
ideological power as a legacy of colonialism” (cited in Zibechi 2010, 106), which 
suggests a strong ethnic consciousness amongst the Aymara.  The Manifesto also makes 
reference to indigenous autonomy by calling upon indigenous communities “to expel the 
repressive bodies of the government, the police, and the army” (cited in Zibechi 2010, 
106) in its sixth and final point. 
As demands for indigenous autonomy grew, the central government passed the 
Law of Indigenous and Citizen Groups (Ley de Agrupaciones Indígenas y Ciudadanas) in 
2004, which allowed for groups other than political parties to contest municipal elections.  
This opened the local political stage to indigenous organizations and allowed for 
communities to select local representatives that were unaffiliated with national-level 
political parties, and which may have been preselected using customary practices, such as 
was the case in Jesús de Machaca during the 2004 municipal elections.  Since indigenous 
peoples were no longer dependent on the state institution of political parties, in many 
cases they were able to practice even greater autonomy at the local level. 
Finally, Bolivia’s most recent Constitution largely addresses demands for 
indigenous autonomy, such as those laid out in the Achacachi Manifesto, by guaranteeing 
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the right to self-government of pre-colonial, indigenous nations and recognizing the 
customs and institutions of the country’s indigenous peoples for the first time in history.  
Under the Constitution, indigenous autonomy, declared through popular referendum at 
the local level, gives a TCO, municipality or region power over its internal governance, 
economic affairs, judicial procedures and mechanisms of social control, within the limits 
of the Constitution and national laws. 
The formal recognition of indigenous autonomy by the Bolivian state is part of a 
momentous effort to further incorporate Bolivia’s historically excluded indigenous 
population into the national political system, an effort meant to make citizenship more 
meaningful primarily through decentralizing reforms and, thus, deepen democracy in the 
country.  Furthermore, scholars and diplomats have cited indigenous autonomy’s 
potential to improve the quality of democracy as a reason to support this reform (García 
Linera 2003; Blanes 2003; Prats 2006).  It seems that indigenous autonomy could 
potentially deepen democracy by provoking necessary changes in Bolivia’s larger 
democratic system, which has historically been flawed due to its exclusion of indigenous 
voices, among other issues.  However, the Bolivian government and indigenous peoples 
have struggled to implement indigenous autonomy within the state’s democratic system. 
In the following chapters, I argue that the institutionalization of indigenous 
political and economic systems in Bolivia under the umbrella of indigenous autonomy 
has failed to deepen democracy because there are tensions between the two systems.  The 
problem is two-fold.  First, indigenous political systems are democratically flawed for 
reasons I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4.  This is problematic because democracy cannot 
be improved through the incorporation of non-democratic elements into the system.  
  9 
These flaws would need to be corrected before indigenous political systems could be 
accepted into the state political system as democratic institutions. 
Second, indigenous autonomy has been implemented in a top-down fashion in 
Bolivia through the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization (Ley Marco de 
Autonomías y Descentralización).  In this process indigenous visions of indigenous 
autonomy were disregarded.  Indigenous peoples were largely dissatisfied with the 
resulting law.  Due to their lack of participation in the elaboration of the Law, the 
changes that indigenous political systems are required to undergo will likely be seen as 
imposed and foreign, and the inhabitants of newly-created indigenous autonomies will 
not identify as closely with the changed systems as with their former political systems.  
Worst of all, by greatly excluding indigenous peoples from the process of drafting and 
ratifying the Law of Autonomy, the state reinforced their marginalization, alienated them 
from democratic civil society, and eroded their quality of citizenship.  This has the effect 
of diminishing the quality of democracy. 
In the next chapter, I will examine definitions of indigenous autonomy as debated 
in three different arenas.  I begin with an analysis of general definitions of indigenous 
autonomy as it has been debated on the world stage by scholars, lawyers, diplomats and 
international organizations.  In proceeding, I focus more narrowly on the debate 
surrounding indigenous autonomy within Bolivia as it applies to that country, including 
scholarly definitions and state definitions as expressed in the 2009 Constitution 
(Constitución Política del Estado, CPE) and the 2010 Framework Law of Autonomy and 
Decentralization.  Finally, I will outline indigenous perspectives of what indigenous 
autonomy should entail, looking specifically at definitions by Bolivia’s indigenous 
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groups.  This chapter will serve to demonstrate how indigenous autonomy has been 
theorized across the globe and what the ideal of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia has 
been. 
In my third chapter, I will focus on the points of contention between indigenous 
autonomy and liberal democracy.  I will present a series of scholarly arguments that 
support indigenous autonomy as a means for deepening democracy accompanied by 
specific counterarguments.  From this analysis, I conclude that indigenous autonomy in 
the Bolivian case has two sets of fatal flaws that prevent this reform from deepening 
democracy in the country.  The first set of flaws is inherent to indigenous political 
systems.  Principally, there are tensions between liberal democracy and the communal 
democracy of indigenous political systems.  The second set of flaws is a result of the way 
in which indigenous autonomy was implemented by the central government in Bolivia. 
Chapter four addresses the first set of flaws for indigenous autonomy in the 
Bolivian case.  I will provide two case studies of indigenous communities in Bolivia and 
their political systems in order to highlight specific instances of non-democratic practices 
and values.  I will explore the usos y costumbres system of the Aymara indigenous 
autonomy of Jesús de Machaca as well as the Capitanía system of the Izoceño-Guaraní.  
This chapter will serve to give concrete examples of tensions between indigenous 
political systems and liberal democracy in the Bolivian case.  I will also touch on 
fundamental changes that must occur in indigenous political systems in order for them to 
be more democratic. 
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I conclude with a discussion of the actual implementation of indigenous 
autonomy in Bolivia.  This will include a discussion of the changes in indigenous 
political systems that the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization demands.  I 
will argue that these demands, unpopular among indigenous groups, are problematic due 
to the fact that the implementation of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia has been a top-
down process; the idea of indigenous autonomy was proposed by political intellectuals in 
Bolivia and formalized by a MAS-dominated Congress, with minimal influence by 
indigenous groups and representation.  Ultimately, I argue that due to the exclusionary 
way in which the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization was defined and 
implemented and due to indigenous groups’ ensuing rejection of the Law, indigenous 
autonomy is unlikely to improve the quality of national-level democracy in Bolivia or to 
make local-level democracy more meaningful.  To the contrary, the process of 
implementation has more likely had a negative impact on the quality of democracy in 
Bolivia since it reinforced the political exclusion of indigenous peoples. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
DEFINING INDIGENOUS AUTONOMY 
 
“The proposition... that every people should freely determine its own 
political status and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural 
development has long been one of which poets have sung and for 
which patriots have been ready to lay down their lives.” 
-Humphrey 1984, 193 
 
 Perhaps the most difficult task in debating the democratic viability of indigenous 
autonomy, along with defining the nebulous concept of democracy, is defining 
indigenous autonomy itself.  Scholarship on the subject is vast, ranging from works that 
focus on sovereignty more generally (Gomez Rovera 1999; Lenzerini 2006; Porter 2002; 
Resnik 1989; Van Cott 2001) to various euro- and U.S.-centric treatments of indigenous 
autonomy (Andersen 2010; UNDRIPS 2007) to debates about what even qualifies a 
person as “indigenous” (Anaya 1996; Brysk 2000; Corntassel 2003; Gurr 1993; Riggs 
1998; Wilmer 1993).  Literature comes from scholars across the globe—including 
Bolivia, specifically—international organizations, the Bolivian state, and indigenous 
peoples themselves in myriad forms. 
 The scholarly preoccupation with indigenous autonomy comes from the fact that 
indigenous peoples were once autonomous peoples that enjoyed territorial, political, 
economic, judicial and cultural sovereignty,2 but they have been deprived of that natural 
right through violence and abuse.  If a state is to consider recognizing or returning the                                                         
2 Nevertheless, a commonly forgotten fact is that many indigenous peoples were conquered by other groups 
prior to the Conquest, which also limited their autonomy. 
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right of autonomy to indigenous peoples it is important to first understand what elements 
constitute indigenous autonomy, as well as what a state’s motivations might be behind 
the recognition of indigenous autonomy beyond the fact that it is a prior right of 
indigenous peoples. 
 I divide this chapter into three sections.  The first examines the concept of 
indigenous autonomy as it has been debated on the world stage by scholars, lawyers, 
diplomats and international organizations.  The second section focuses more narrowly on 
the debate surrounding indigenous autonomy within Bolivia as it applies to that country, 
including scholarly definitions and state definitions as expressed in the 2009 Constitution 
(Constitución Política del Estado, CPE) and the 2010 Framework Law of Autonomy and 
Decentralization (Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización).  This discussion will 
also look briefly at the varying attitudes toward regional autonomy movements versus the 
movement for indigenous autonomy.  The final section will outline indigenous 
perspectives of what indigenous autonomy should entail.  Though I will briefly enter into 
the opinions of the international indigenous community, I will focus specifically on the 
ideas expressed by Bolivia’s indigenous groups. 
This chapter serves to discuss the ideal of indigenous autonomy from the 
perspectives of the international community, the Bolivian intellectual community, the 
Bolivian state and different indigenous groups.  From a thorough examination of the 
debate, I ultimately focus on the ideal that indigenous autonomy serves as a method for 
political decentralization, which should make democracy more meaningful at the local 
level for indigenous citizens.  In subsequent chapters I will analyze the reality of 
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indigenous autonomy in Bolivia, which represents a stark contrast to the democratic 
improvement that this reform promises. 
 
Internationally Debated Definitions 
 
 In order to define indigenous autonomy it is helpful to separate the term into its 
composite parts: “indigenous” and “autonomy.”  The first term has been a source of 
endless debate, especially within Latin America.  In Bolivia, over 30 recognized 
indigenous nations exist (including Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, Uru, Chiquitano, 
Moxeño and Tacana) and 62 percent of the national population self-identifies as a 
member of one of these groups according to the last (2001) census.  Therefore, outlining 
an operational definition of “indigenous” is imperative to any definition of indigenous 
autonomy and especially in the Bolivian context where such an institution could 
potentially impact the majority of the population. 
Since identity is a social construct (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Chandra 2006), divisions 
among groups of people in a given society are not clear or objective.  Definitions of what 
attributes classify a person as indigenous have shifted over time and have been strongly 
tied to historical and political factors, especially the institutionalized racism that has been 
prevalent throughout Latin America.  Chandra (2006, 398) defines membership within a 
specific ethnic identity as based upon “attributes associated with, or believed to be 
associated with, descent.”  In Latin America, this definition has historically labeled 
people as criollo, mestizo or indigenous. 
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An additional question related to ethnic identity begs a response: who has the 
authority to assign a person a certain ethnic identity?  There are three possibilities: (1) 
other people assign membership (imposed identity), (2) a set of attributes confers 
membership, and (3) each individual self-identifies.  After the initial conquest, 
indigenous identity was imposed upon individuals for political and economic purposes.  
However, later measurements of indigeneity have used cultural and linguistic attributes 
and/or self-identification methods. 
The Bolivian Constitution refers to indigenous peoples of the nation as “pre-
colonial” and with “ancestral dominion over their lands” (Art. 2).  I will define 
indigenous peoples in much the same way.  Broadly, I define indigenous peoples as the 
descendants of those peoples inhabiting an area prior to the arrival of a conquering 
people.  Therefore, indigenous autonomy in Latin America applies to those peoples who 
identify as heirs of pre-Colombian peoples. 
Proceeding to the second half of “indigenous autonomy,” scholars have used the 
term “autonomy” interchangeably with “sovereignty” and “self-determination.”  Some 
scholars have defined sovereignty in purely legal terms (Gomez Rovera 1999; Porter 
2002; Resnik 1989).  However, sovereignty is more often tied to territory in addition to 
legal independence (Andersen 2010; Lenzerini 2006; Van Cott 2001).  Lenzerini (2006, 
159-160), for example, defines sovereignty in contemporary terms as “territorial 
independence subject to no legal constraints except those imposed by international law.”  
Sovereignty has also been defined in political terms in the context of the modern nation-
state (Chatterjee 2004), which also has strong territorial implications.  The term “self-
determination” is also frequently used in conjunction with autonomy.  Alison Brysk 
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(2000, 60) defines self-determination as “the collective empowerment of peoples 
sufficient to enable effective management of development, cultural contact, and political 
representation.”  Thus, self-determination, unlike sovereignty, does not have strong 
territorial implications and tends to be more exclusively political in nature. 
The concept of indigenous autonomy has been broadly defined as “the freedom of 
a people to choose what their future will be” (Porter 2002, 75).  Gomez Rovera (1999, 
43) narrows this definition slightly by specifying that indigenous autonomy is “the right 
to make decisions about issues that are fundamental to their culture.”  Nevertheless, both 
of these definitions are extremely vague.  After all, who decides which issues are 
fundamental to the culture of a people?  And, when the collective future of one people 
conflicts with the collective future of another, which will concede its right to autonomy? 
The United Nations, after upholding indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination, provides a somewhat more detailed definition, defining indigenous 
autonomy as the right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development” (UNDRIPS 2007, Art. 3).  This definition, at 
the least, provides four pillars upon which to base indigenous autonomy: political, 
economic, social and cultural. 
Similarly, Martin Edwin Andersen (2010, 111) states that indigenous autonomy 
allows for indigenous peoples to “create governing statutes and bodies, elect their 
autorities [sic] using customary practices, plan their own economic development and 
manage the renewable resources found in their territory,” as well as administer justice 
using customary law and practices.  This definition elaborates minimally on what the four 
pillars of indigenous autonomy introduced by the U.N. may entail in real terms.  Under 
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the political pillar, indigenous peoples would be able to create their own laws and 
government organs.  In economic terms, indigenous peoples would have control over 
their own economic development and natural resources.  The social aspect includes the 
right for customary mechanisms of social control.  Finally, the cultural element 
underlines the right of indigenous peoples to elect their authorities and administer justice 
using customary practices.  Anderson also hints at another dimension of autonomy, which 
is land rights. 
The importance of land rights for indigenous groups should not be understated.  
Van Cott (2001, 31), for example, refers to indigenous autonomy as politico-territorial 
autonomy, stressing that claims to such autonomy “are based on centuries of attachment 
to specific territories and self-government practices.”  Lenzerini (2006) also defines 
indigenous autonomy in purely territorial and political terms (at least economic, social 
and cultural dimensions are not explicit).  First, he stakes the claim that, prior to the 
conquest, indigenous peoples were originally sovereign over their territories and then 
“illegitimately deprived of the lands ancestrally occupied and governed by them” 
(Lenzerini 2006, 165) by invading peoples who, consequently, violated their de facto 
right of sovereignty, which gives them the legitimate right to a return of that territorial 
sovereignty.  In political terms, Lenzerini (2006, 165) defines indigenous autonomy as 
“self-government” or “internal self-determination,” which “would never be so wide as to 
override the supreme sovereign powers of the national government.”  This last comment 
has become a central point in the Bolivian debate over indigenous autonomy, as some 
indigenous groups have pushed for greater authority than the central government will 
allow. 
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The concept of indigenous autonomy becomes increasingly complicated when it 
is imagined within the context of the state.  Since the state that was imposed upon 
indigenous peoples in Latin America centuries ago is not willing to forfeit its own right to 
sovereignty, any sub-national, internal autonomy will necessarily be limited by the 
overriding sovereignty of the larger state.  This is a fundamental flaw found in most 
efforts to implement indigenous autonomy and becomes critical in understanding the 
problems that arise in these efforts.  In later chapters, I will discuss the political and 
cultural distortions that must occur to indigenous customary practices for indigenous 
autonomy to exist within the context of the state in greater depth.  For the purpose of this 
chapter, I will merely define indigenous autonomy. 
I define indigenous autonomy generally, based upon the scholarly definitions just 
discussed, as the formal recognition of a people’s right to freely determine its political, 
economic, social and cultural norms and institutions, processes of development, and 
systems of justice at the community level within their defined territory and when not in 
violation of the laws of the national government.  I will specify what this definition 
entails for the Bolivian case in the next two sections. 
 
The Bolivian Debate 
 
 The first item of note within the Bolivian debate over indigenous autonomy is the 
actual terminology to be used when referring to this institution.  In the 2009 Constitution, 
the central government decided upon the term Autonomía Indígena Originaria 
Campesina, which translates to English rather awkwardly as Indigenous First Peoples 
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Peasant Autonomy, and which I will refer to simply as “indigenous autonomy” 
throughout this paper.  The important thing to note is that the term “autonomy” carries 
three defining adjectives.  More importantly, when talking about plural autonomies the 
term changes to Autonomías Indígena Originaria Campesinas, where only one of the 
qualifiers takes on the plural form, thus signifying that the three words following 
“autonomía” are indivisible and refer to a single concept.  This three-word unit is born 
out of a disagreement in terminology between Bolivia’s myriad indigenous peoples 
themselves. 
According to Albó and Romero (2009, 4), the term “indígena” is preferred by 
indigenous peoples in the lowlands (tierras bajas) or the eastern portion of Bolivia, such 
as the Guaraní.  The international community also prefers this term.  Nevertheless, the 
peoples of the Andean region are especially averse to this term because of the racist ways 
it has been used in the past.  During the 1952 National Revolution and the ensuing 
Agrarian Reform, the term was almost entirely eradicated from national discourse in 
exchange for the more “progressive” campesino (peasant).  It is just in the past few 
decades that lowland groups have revamped the word “indígena,” recognizing the power 
it holds among international groups and NGOs.  The alternative originario, a term 
originating in the Colonial era, is greatly preferred in the Andean region.  This term tends 
to have better connotations for highland peoples, especially since it distinguished them 
from the agregados of the Colonial tribute system.3 
                                                        
3 In the colonial era, indigenous community members were divided into originarios and agregados (or 
forasteros) for taxation purposes.  Originarios were natives of the communities where they lived and, thus, 
land owners.  They paid greater tribute.  Agregados held a lower social status generally and had moved 
from their original communities to a new one (usually to avoid obligatory mine service) where they were 
forced to rent land (Suárez Fernández, Ramos Pérez and Lohmann Villena 1984, 399) 
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Campesino is the other term of choice by highland indigenous groups.  However, 
this term is more controversial among indigenous groups.  It originates from the time of 
the National Revolution and the Agrarian Reform in 1952 and 1953, respectively.  This 
class-based term sought to avoid the discrimination associated with the terms “indio” and 
“indígena.”  However, it did so by erasing ethnic implications completely.  Moreover, 
contemporary use of the term campesino tends to refer to indigenous peoples who have 
migrated away from their original territories and communities and now consider 
themselves to be part of the Reconstituted First Peoples of Bolivia.  The majority makes a 
living as cocaleros (coca farmers) instead of surviving as subsistence farmers, as 
Quechua and Aymara peoples traditionally have.  The term “campesino” mainly 
integrates the colonizadores, who represent displaced individuals from the Kollasuyo 
nation and from the Amazonian region and have settled in Bolivia’s valleys and 
lowlands, with a large concentration in the Chapare region, where Evo Morales is from.  
The contention in including this term alongside “indígena” and “originario” comes from 
the fact that not all campesinos identify with an indigenous heritage and they generally 
have no historic claim to their land.  However, many colonizadores are adamant about 
their indigenous identity and maintain a right to land generally since they have been 
misplaced from their original lands.  Some Bolivians stipulate that the term “campesino” 
was included as a political move to maintain the support of the colonizadores and 
Morales’ support base within the Chapare region and amongst the cocaleros. 
 Along with the complex terminology, the issue of indigenous autonomy is also 
complicated in the Bolivian case by the presence of regional demands for autonomy in 
addition to indigenous demands.  Autonomy has been discussed in public, legal, political 
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and academic forums, giving voice to all sectors of Bolivian society.  Autonomy has 
become central to state policy under the presidency of Evo Morales, partially because 
indigenous peoples have seen the election of the country’s first indigenous president as a 
window of opportunity to push demands that have been building for centuries, and 
partially because certain policy changes under President Morales have provoked renewed 
secessionist movements from the Media Luna (the more conservative, less indigenous, 
resource-rich departments of eastern Bolivia: Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija). 
Though the debate surrounding indigenous autonomy had largely been confined 
to academic and intellectual settings until a few years ago, it has become an issue of 
popular discussion recently.  As a result, departmental and indigenous autonomy have 
assumed a kind of duality, the first represented by the “Camba nation” and the latter by 
the “Aymara nation” as termed by Zegada, Tórrez and Salinas (2006, 42).  The former is 
based on a civic-regional vision, and the latter on an ethno-cultural conception (Zegada, 
Tórrez and Salinas 2006, 42).  The two definitions have fed off of each other in many 
ways, creating mutually exclusive identities and conceptions of autonomy.  The effect has 
been an extreme polarization between the two types of autonomy and the groups with 
which they are associated.  Therefore, it is difficult to discuss indigenous autonomy 
without also touching on regional autonomy.  Additionally, analyzing demands for 
departmental autonomy leads to a more robust understanding of indigenous autonomy 
because it provokes important questions about what groups have the right to petition for 
autonomy from the central government, what should be the legitimate basis of their 
demands (political, cultural, economic), and—most importantly—how indigenous 
autonomy can be defined in contrast to other forms of autonomy. 
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In attempting to define the relationship between these two forms of autonomy in 
Bolivia, one argument tries to posit a cause and effect association.  For example, Chávez 
Leon (2008) argues that the concept of “autonomy” in Bolivia came from these 
secessionist movements and the concept of “indigenous autonomy” was born as a 
backlash to these movements.  I refute this, however, since the ideals of indigenous 
autonomy have little in common with those of departmental autonomy, and historical 
events, such as the creation of Indigenous Municipalities and First People’s Communal 
Territories (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCO) and the gas and water wars, show an 
independent effort by indigenous peoples to establish greater autonomy from the state. 
 Demands for departmental autonomy were revamped as a reaction to changes in 
economic policy implemented under the Morales regime.4  Specifically, citizens and 
elites of Bolivia’s eastern departments were upset by changes in the tax system and the 
redistribution of hydrocarbon revenues.  Previously, producing departments had been 
immensely favored in the redistribution of these funds.  As a result of the change, they 
threatened to secede from the nation based on economic grounds.  This was met by 
severe reprimands from the central government and Morales supporters. 
Humberto Fajardo Sainz (2006), one Bolivian scholar, in his book entitled 
Volveré y Seré Millones, in reference to Tupaj Katari’s reputed final threatening words to 
his Spanish assassins, criticizes the departmental autonomy movements for destroying 
Bolivian national unity, which was made sacred during the 1952 National Revolution.  
He argues, “Bolivia is a ridiculous and cracked centralist State with autonomist 
tendencies, with nine flags and various regional symbols, its leaders fighting like dogs                                                         
4 Eastern demands for autonomy have a long and cyclical history in Bolivia (see Rodríguez Ostria 1995), 
but became especially heated during Evo Morales’ first term as president from 2005 to 2010. 
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and cats over natural resources, which belong to the people, in their craze to regionalize 
them” (40, author’s translation).  Fajardo Sainz blames these autonomist tendencies on 
the racism of the elite, in clear support of indigenous rights.  Nevertheless, the central 
government under Morales pushed to recognize indigenous autonomy.  The reaction of 
the central government towards departmental autonomy in contrast to its reaction towards 
indigenous autonomy provokes some important questions.  Was it hypocritical for the 
Bolivian government to suppress one form of autonomy while upholding another?  What 
differences are there between departmental and indigenous autonomy? 
The government’s contradictory reactions clearly created some internal discord, 
and the Bolivian government eventually allowed for municipal, departmental, regional 
and indigenous autonomy in the 2009 Constitution.  The main differences between 
departmental and indigenous autonomy are as follows.  Departmental autonomy seeks 
territorial secession from the nation, while indigenous autonomy has not made such 
demands.  This first difference is the principal factor that provoked differing reactions 
from the state towards these two types of autonomy.  Moreover, departmental autonomy 
movements have demanded rights to subsoil resources, such as natural gas, while these 
demands that would be so taxing on the state’s financial well-being have been largely 
absent in movements for indigenous autonomy.  Additionally, indigenous autonomy 
bases its petition on an ethnic identity that implies prior rights to sovereignty, whereas 
departmental autonomy can make no such legitimating claims.  Finally, there is an 
element of cultural preservation implicit in indigenous autonomy, which (though 
cruceños, as Santa Cruz’s inhabitants are called, may fiercely accuse the MAS 
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government of threatening their culture) is definitely not a central concern of 
departmental autonomy. 
Moving into a more specifically academic niche of the public forum, I will now 
explore the intellectual debate surrounding indigenous autonomy, which predates the 
popular debate.  This debate includes scholarship from intellectuals such as Ramiro 
Condarco Morales (1970), Xavier Albó (1999), Silvia Rivera (1987), Simón Yampara 
(2001; 2006), Fernando Garcés (2008) and Diego Pacheco (1992) who see in indigenous 
autonomy the possibility of decolonizing the Bolivian State.  Others (Colque 2006; 
García Linera 2003; Patzi 2007) have proposed the necessary creation of a more modern 
multicultural state, which implies asymmetrical rights and representation for different 
national and ethnic identities—what García Linera (2003, 188) refers to as “differentiated 
citizenship” (ciudadanía diferenciada)—through granting indigenous autonomy.  Still 
others (Blanes 2003; Prats 2006) have focused on autonomy as part of the 
decentralization process in Bolivia.  I join this latter side of the debate by framing 
indigenous autonomy within the context of political and legal decentralization as a 
process with the potential to make democracy more meaningful at the local level for 
indigenous citizens, Bolivia’s largest historically excluded group. 
Among the intellectuals in the debate, several identify themselves as indigenous, 
such as Fausto Reinaga, an Aymara intellectual who inspired the Andean Oral History 
Workshop (Taller de Historia Oral Andina), which seeks to reconstruct the original ayllu 
communities and to aid indigenous peoples in their fight for equal rights and political 
participation.  MAS has given powerful voice to some by bringing them into the party, 
such as was the case with Félix Patzi—who is now estranged from the party following a 
  25 
drunk driving incident during his candidacy for the governorship of La Paz under the 
party’s ticket (Los Tiempos 2010).  The most influential intellectual in the actual 
implementation of indigenous autonomy is Vice President Álvaro García Linera due to 
his current position with the central government. 
Thus, when approaching the Bolivian state’s definition of indigenous autonomy it 
is important to understand three things.  First, though indigenous peoples over the past 
several decades have taken advantage of available opportunities to become more 
autonomous from the state, indigenous autonomy in Bolivia has been widely theorized by 
the academic community.  Second, intellectuals actively involved in the scholarly debate 
surrounding indigenous autonomy have become deeply involved in the MAS party and 
the central government.  As a result, indigenous autonomy has principally been a top-
down initiative inspired by academics, rather than a bottom-up process shaped by the 
demands of indigenous communities. 
In turning to the central government’s definition of indigenous autonomy as 
expressed in the 2009 Constitution and the Law of Autonomy (as I will refer to the 
Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization from this point forward), it is worth 
examining García Linera’s definitions of indigenous autonomy as postulated prior to 
assuming the Vice Presidency.  As imagined by García Linera (2003, 192-193), 
indigenous autonomy in Bolivia would imply political autonomy within the Bolivian 
state; the right to elect executive authorities; the preservation of proportionality and equal 
ethnic representation; inclusion of non-indigenous inhabitants within the territorial 
autonomy; territorial jurisdiction with shared responsibility over education, judiciary 
affairs, land grants, and the management and protection of natural resources; and access 
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to state funding.  This definition of indigenous autonomy is part of a larger vision by 
García Linera of a restructured, plurinational state that allows for the expression of 
distinct ethnic and national identities, starting with autonomies.  According to Raúl 
Zibechi (2010, 116), such state reforms would be “aimed at democratizing the political 
unit while preserving political and cultural diversity” (author’s emphasis).  In subsequent 
chapters, I explore the issue of recognizing indigenous autonomy as a means to further 
deepen Bolivian democracy at the national level. 
Regardless of the feasibility of García Linera’s aims, his views are reflected in the 
vision of the current national government and in the new Constitution.  Article 2 of the 
2009 Constitution outlines the core principles of indigenous autonomy: 
Given the pre-colonial existence of the indigenous nations and peoples and their 
ancestral dominion over their territories, their self-determination within the 
framework of state unity is guaranteed, which consists of their right to autonomy, 
to self-government, to their culture, to the recognition of their institutions and to 
the consolidation of their territorial entities, in conformity with this Constitution 
and the law. 
 
 Thus, according to the CPE, indigenous peoples hold the right to autonomy based 
upon their prior sovereignty and rule over ancestral lands, and this autonomy in more 
detailed terms implies: autonomous government organs within a community’s specific 
jurisdiction; the direct election of authorities by citizens; the exercise of legislative, 
statutory, fiscal, and executive faculties; observance and preservation of their culture; and 
administration of economic resources.  This autonomy is limited, however, by the 
Constitution and laws of the state.  The recognition that indigenous peoples hold rights 
that are prior to the state while obligating them to exercise these rights within the 
confines of the state structure, is a glaring contradiction in the legal framework for 
indigenous autonomy that has sparked massive debates between indigenous groups and 
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MAS.  This contradiction is also central to the tensions between liberal democracy and 
indigenous autonomy, as I will discuss in depth in later chapters. 
 
Indigenous Perspectives 
 
 No discussion of indigenous autonomy would be complete without including the 
views and opinions of those most impacted by the decision to formalize it.  In this 
section, I examine how indigenous peoples on an international level and within Bolivia 
have imagined indigenous autonomy, what rights they believe it should include, and how 
the political system of a recognized indigenous autonomy might appear in practice. 
For the international indigenous movement,5 indigenous autonomy has been 
defined as “the power of decision and control belonging to the Indigenous Peoples and 
Nations in their territories in the administrative, legal, political, economic, social and 
cultural realms with the existence and recognition of Separate Authorities in coordination 
with central authorities” (Espinoza 2009, 23, author’s translation).  The power of decision 
is a common thread that runs through all sides of the debate.  This definition also calls 
upon the right to territory.  Based on her study of claims for indigenous autonomy in 
Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela, Donna Lee Van Cott (2001) also 
points to the importance of territory in indigenous definitions of autonomy, especially the 
right to manage the resources within that territory. 
Nevertheless, not all indigenous definitions of autonomy stress the importance of 
territory.  In the Draft Declaration of Principles proposed by the Indian Law Resource                                                         
5 While it is impossible to generalize the perspectives of the world’s myriad indigenous groups, the 
international indigenous movement speaks with a unified voice for strategic purposes. 
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Center, Four Directions Council, Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the International 
Indian Treaty Council, indigenous autonomy includes “the right to freely determine their 
political status, freely pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural 
development, and determine their own... citizenship” (Hannum 1996, 95), but it makes no 
explicit reference to the right to territory.  However, this is not the case in Bolivia. 
Within Bolivia, land has been exceedingly important, especially for groups in 
eastern Bolivia whose territory is vulnerable to encroachment by companies seeking to 
extract resources.  In fact, the Confederation of Bolivia’s Indigenous Peoples 
(Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, CIDOB) organized formal protests 
against the content of the Law of Autonomy, in which one of their principal complaints 
was based on territorial unity.  In their Plataforma de Demandas de los Pueblos 
Indígenas del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia Boliviana (translated, Platform of Demands of 
the Indigenous Peoples of the Orient, Chaco and Bolivian Amazon) representing the 
demands of eastern Bolivian indigenous groups, CIDOB (2010a) argued that indigenous 
autonomy should not be forced to conform to the territorial limits of the municipalities 
carved out by the state, which do not represent natural borders and tend to cut indigenous 
communities in half.  The Aymara intellectual Simón Yampara (2005) has upheld this 
complaint by arguing that creating indigenous autonomies on top of the foundations of 
current territorial structures would signify a subalternized version of autonomy, 
subverting indigenous territorial definitions to those of the state. 
Additionally, the Izoceño-Guaraní people in the current indigenous autonomy of 
Charagua in the department of Santa Cruz, indicate that the most important element of 
their autonomy is land rights and control over their natural resources, followed by food 
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production, “traditional” healthcare, access to Guaraní and post-colonial education and 
the right to teach their own history (Rocha Torrico 2008, 135).  While other principles, 
including the right to original forms of political organization, figure within their 
definition of indigenous, the most important aspects are related to land and culture. 
While lowland indigenous groups tend to lend greater stress to territorial rights, 
highland groups focus more strongly on political autonomy.  In the Norte de Potosí 
region, including the municipality of Chayanta, the right to traditional political 
organization figures strongly amongst the community’s most important elements for 
indigenous autonomy (Rocha Torrico 2008).  Additionally, for the Quechua region of 
Kallawaya (which includes the current indigenous autonomy of Charazani) in the 
department of La Paz, “‘politico-organizational autonomy’ represents the principal value 
that articulates and gives meaning to the collective life of the kallawaya people” (Rocha 
Torrico 2008, 145, author’s translation).  In both of these communities, the political 
aspect of autonomy figures most prominently in their definitions of indigenous 
autonomy. 
However, land has not been insignificant either for highland peoples.  For 
example, Raqaypampa, a Quechua TCO that lies in central Bolivia near Cochabamba, 
gives importance to territory for its definition of indigenous autonomy by explicitly 
discussing land in the first and second articles of its autonomy statute.  Article 1, entitled 
“Plurinational State, Self-Determination and Autonomy,” states, “In the application of 
that right [of self-determination], self-governance founded upon our territoriality, culture, 
history, languages, and organization is exercised” (author’s translation).  The following 
Article is dedicated to defining territorial rights and limits of the community, as 
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suggested by its title “The Indigenous Territory of Raqaypampa.”  Along with land, the 
community stresses the importance of autonomous judicial, political, social and economic 
institutions for its definition of indigenous autonomy.  Underlying these principles is the 
right of indigenous peoples to practice their own culture.  For example, in Aymara and 
Quechua communities, judicial institutions follow norms of communal justice, while 
political institutions rely on the community’s usos y costumbres, both manifestations of 
indigenous culture. 
Since this paper focuses principally on the customary political systems of 
indigenous communities, it is of central importance to discuss the specifics of usos y 
costumbres.  While the term “customary” or “traditional” is often used in conjunction 
with indigenous political systems, and I will use these terms throughout, it is important to 
note that contemporary indigenous political systems do not exist unchanged since pre-
colonial times.  They have been greatly impacted by the cacicazgo in the late 1700s, 
which was the delegitimation and demise of the hereditary indigenous leaders after the 
arrival of the Spanish and the abuse by the colonizers of the traditional indigenous system 
of reciprocity via local caciques and kurakas (Thomson 2002).  This has led to the 
systems of communal democracy and usos y costumbres used today in many Aymara and 
Quechua communities.  While usos y costumbres vary from community to community, 
they tend to be fairly similar across Aymara and Quechua communities, though with 
different terms for the similar concepts due to the difference in language between the two 
identities.  Usos y costumbres usually employ public voting for leaders by community 
members.  This is usually accomplished by simply gathering the community together and 
having residents line up behind the candidate of their choice.  Aymara and Quechua 
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communities also use a system of rotation of cargos to designate authorities that occupy 
power for a limited period of time “to ensure no monopoly of power” (Zibechi 2010, 
104).  In indigenous political imaginings, particularly in Bolivia, authority is seen as 
being subject to the will of the community, instead of something apart from and superior 
to the community (Zibechi 2010, 119).  It is not meant to be consolidated and wielded 
over the people. 
In order to remain accountable to community members, traditionally appointed 
leaders govern through a series of mass meetings and assemblies (Zibechi 2010, 104).  
For example, in traditional Aymara communities, these meetings are called tantachawis 
and are divided into three categories: jisk’a tantachawi, taypi tantachawi and jach’a 
tantachawi.  The first is a meeting among community members and their leaders in times 
of emergency.  The second occurs monthly to review community orders of business.  The 
jach’a tantachawi is the chief meeting of the year, where community authorities are 
changed and decisions are made with regard to supremely important issues, such as social 
and economic policies (CEBEM 2009, 34).  With the granting of indigenous autonomy, 
these institutions of public voting and community decision-making are formally 
recognized and the policies and decisions at which communities arrive through these 
institutions are upheld by the central government.  Though I have only discussed usos y 
costumbres briefly here, later, I will give detailed case studies that explore the customary 
political systems of two different communities—Jesus de Machaca and Izozog. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have elaborated on three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, 
arenas of debate and analysis surrounding the concept of “indigenous autonomy.”  I 
began by outlining the international scholarly debate, beginning with a discussion of the 
intricacies and complications of defining to which individuals and peoples the term 
“indigenous” should apply.  Moving on to definitions of the term “indigenous 
autonomy,” I noted that different scholars have stressed the importance of different 
aspects of autonomy, such as land rights, political self-determination and preservation of 
culture.  From these myriad conceptions, I distilled the definition of indigenous autonomy 
as the formal recognition of a people’s right to freely determine its political, economic, 
social and cultural norms and institutions, processes of development, and systems of 
justice at the community level within their defined territory and when not in violation of 
the laws of the national government. 
The second level of debate that I examined was particular to Bolivia, situated by 
scholars and the state.  I discussed the recent culmination of the debate over indigenous 
autonomy in a popular battle between the Aymara nation and the Camba nation, vying for 
indigenous and regional autonomy, respectively.  The intellectual debate surrounding the 
concept has been headed by indigenous and non-indigenous scholars alike and has had a 
sizeable impact on state policies towards indigenous autonomy.  The state recently 
recognized indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy based upon their pre-colonial existence 
in their ancestral lands.  In the 2009 Constitution and the Law of Autonomy, the central 
government defined indigenous autonomy in political, legal, economic, cultural and 
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territorial terms.  This definition, however, includes the caveat that indigenous peoples 
must exercise their pre-colonial right to autonomy within the “framework of state unity” 
and “in conformity with [the state] Constitution and the law” (Art. 2).  This has created 
conflict between indigenous groups and the state, and has become a core impediment to 
the possibility of deepening democracy in Bolivia through the recognition of indigenous 
autonomy. 
The final level of analysis has been on the opinions of those most affected by the 
recognition of indigenous autonomy: indigenous peoples.  This discussion included the 
opinions of the international indigenous community in addition to indigenous groups in 
Bolivia, specifically.  Though lowland indigenous peoples have placed greater stress on 
territorial sovereignty, highland groups have also held communal land rights as a core 
principle of indigenous autonomy.  Additionally, the right of indigenous peoples to 
observe and preserve their respective cultures underlies all of their demands.  In the 
political realm, which is of greatest interest to the purposes of this paper, this implies 
indigenous peoples’ right to practice traditional usos y costumbres.  I gave some brief 
examples of these political methods, which I will explore in greater detail in later 
chapters. 
In the following chapter, I will focus on tensions between indigenous political 
systems and liberal democracy.  As I will argue, these inherent incompatibilities are a 
primary reason why indigenous autonomy has failed to deepen democracy in Bolivia.  
Any attempt at reconciling the two systems must begin with an intimate understanding of 
these issues.  However, reconciliation will not guarantee democratic deepening.  As I will 
demonstrate, if the state simply forces indigenous political situations to conform with 
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liberal democratic ideals (instead of engaging in transforming dialogue with indigenous 
groups), indigenous peoples may become further marginalized, resulting in an erosion of 
the quality of democracy in Bolivia. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INDIGENOUS AUTONOMY AND DEMOCRACY 
 
“Without democracy there cannot be liberty or justice or 
dignity.  And without dignity there is nothing.” 
-Zapatista Army of National Liberation, 1994 
 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between indigenous autonomy and 
democracy for two reasons.  First, in recent years, the world has experienced a 
democratic boom.  In 2010, 60 percent of the world’s sovereign nation-states were 
electoral democracies.6  The popularity of the democratic form of government is due in 
large part to the benefits it promises.  In political theory, democracies are understood to 
be less violent and more socially just than non-democratic alternatives.  Moreover, 
democracy often leads to such rights and liberties as freedom of expression, free press, 
and economic equality.  Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin (2004) argue that democratic 
regimes, because they are based on contested elections, are more likely to sustain certain 
liberties and to work to provide more public goods.  In the end, the democratic system 
creates a cycle where, by virtue of having to be chosen from amongst other candidates 
and being more easily replaceable by a competitor, leaders have a higher level of 
accountability with the people.  Thus, because it would behoove them to do so, public 
officials are more likely to fulfill popular desires and demands to a greater extent.  
                                                        
6 In 2010, Freedom House labeled 116 countries as electoral democracies 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=548&year=2010), while the U.S. State Department 
recognized 194 countries as of 2009 (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm). 
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Therefore, because democracy is so beneficial in theory, I concern myself in this work 
with the impact indigenous autonomy might have on this form of government.  Under 
ideal circumstances, indigenous autonomy would provoke a decentralizing change in 
Bolivia’s national political system, leading to more meaningful democracy. 
Scholars have debated the meaning of democracy for centuries.  Definitions have 
ranged from those by Aristotle to Joseph Schumpeter to Robert Dahl.  For the purposes of 
this chapter, I follow Dahl’s lead, viewing his minimal conditions for polyarchy (as listed 
in Schmitter and Karl 1991, 81) as a good base for a robust definition of democracy.7  
Dahl’s first requirement is that elected officials are constitutionally granted control over 
government decisions.  Additionally, these officials are to be chosen in periodic and fair 
elections that are generally free from coercion.  With few exceptions, all adults must have 
the right to vote in said elections as well as having the right to run for eligible offices of 
government.  Citizens should be free to express their political inclinations and ideas 
without fear of harsh repercussions.  This freedom of expression encompasses freedom of 
belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition as 
listed by Larry Diamond (1996, 24).  Dahl also requires that citizens have a right to 
alternative sources of information, whose existence is protected by law.  Finally, citizens 
have a right to form independent organizations and associations such as political parties 
and interest groups through which they may express their demands and represent their 
values and needs. 
It is important to add to Dahl’s conditions one more requirement that is 
particularly important for the quality of citizenship in an indigenous autonomy.                                                          
7 While there are various contemporary models of democracy (see Held 2006 for more), throughout this 
thesis I refer to liberal democracy as the ideal. 
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Minorities and disadvantaged majorities should not face discriminatory practices, such as 
impediments to voting due to linguistic or cultural barriers.  In the case of Bolivia, this 
would require the full integration of all citizens within the indigenous community, 
specifically non-indigenous inhabitants and inhabitants belonging to a non-dominant 
indigenous group within the indigenous autonomy.  With these minimal conditions for 
democracy in mind, I present a series of scholarly arguments in support of indigenous 
autonomy as a means for deepening democracy and a series of counterarguments.  I use 
this scholarly debate to form my own argument that indigenous autonomy has not 
deepened democracy in Bolivia for two reasons.  First, indigenous political systems 
contain some features that make them incompatible with liberal democracy.  The quality 
of a democracy in a country cannot be improved by introducing non-democratic elements 
into the political system.  Second, the way in which indigenous autonomy was 
implemented in Bolivia reinforced the marginalization of the country’s indigenous 
peoples, compounding the state’s pre-existing problems of democratic legitimacy. 
In the following section, I begin my discussion of the scholarly debate 
surrounding the democratic possibilities for indigenous autonomy by exploring a 
category of arguments that I term “citizenship arguments.” 
 
Deepening Democracy Through Indigenous Autonomy: The Citizenship Argument 
 
Democracy originated with the ancient Greeks.  In ancient Athens, citizens were 
directly involved in legislative and judicial affairs; they were the public officials.  There 
are two implications of the Greek form of democracy: 1) political systems functioned 
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around cities instead of nation-states, thus the constituency was smaller and more 
manageable and 2) all citizens were equal before the law.  This made it possible for all to 
assemble on a regular basis and decide their affairs in a sovereign manner.  The citizenry, 
of course, did not include women, slaves or those of foreign descent.  Consequently, as 
Frances Hagopian (2007, 21) points out, the challenge to democracy beyond ancient 
Greece has been “to devise ways to make citizens out of people who are not truly free 
and equal, to constitute a democratic form of rule in societies so large and complex that 
‘direct democracy’ is not technically possible.”  This has been a key problem for 
democracy in Bolivia specifically, where the majority of the population belongs to a 
historically marginalized group, and indigenous autonomy constitutes a method of 
integrating these excluded peoples and bringing them closer to the state system. 
Starting in 1952 with the implementation of universal suffrage, the Bolivian state 
has sought to improve the quality of the country’s democracy by extending full 
citizenship rights to marginalized citizens, specifically indigenous peoples.  This larger 
struggle, which also includes the 1994 Law of Popular Participation, is meant to make 
citizenship more inclusive and meaningful.  A democracy cannot exist without the input 
of its citizens.  Therefore, in order for democracy to be meaningful, citizenship must be 
meaningful for all.  Eric Hershberg (1999, 292) states: “For democracy to flourish, 
individuals must be capable of articulating political preferences, organizing collectively 
in civil society, and participating, both individually and through civic associations, in the 
political process.”  Hence, a democratic government that unevenly allows its citizens to 
exercise their citizenship, or does not allow them to do so at all, loses legitimacy as a 
democracy. 
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Historically, community systems of governance have existed parallel to state 
systems in Bolivia.  Within the community, these systems have been recognized as the 
supreme moral authority, but they have been ignored as much as possible by the central 
government.  This has greatly marginalized indigenous peoples, resulting in a crisis of 
citizenship and a weakened democracy.  As a means to address this, the current 
government of Evo Morales has granted indigenous communities the right to autonomy 
and declared Bolivia a “plurinational” state, which constitutes “a recognition of the 
existence of a parallel community within the polity” (Brysk 2000, 62), specifically the 
myriad indigenous nations within the country’s borders.  Since indigenous autonomy 
incorporates pre-existing political institutions—institutions that are already seen as 
legitimate sources of authority by community members—into the larger political system 
of the state, indigenous autonomy, in theory, gives power to previously ignored actions 
and decisions within indigenous communities.  This power makes the exercise of 
citizenship rights locally by indigenous peoples within their communities more 
meaningful.  By legitimating institutions in which indigenous peoples already 
participated on the national level, indigenous autonomy allows indigenous peoples to 
articulate their political preferences through customary practices, organize collectively in 
civil society through community-level political meetings, and participate in the political 
process by both representing their fellow community members or selecting a fellow 
community member to represent them before the state.  In turn, this should fortify 
democracy at all levels of the state.  The central government’s focus on broadening and 
enriching the definition of citizenship should, ideally, have a positive impact on 
democracy in the country. 
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One argument that supports the case that indigenous autonomy serves to deepen 
democracy is the recognition of indigenous autonomy as part of a longer process of 
decentralization that seeks to make citizenship more meaningful (Blanes 2003; Prats 
2006).  Another argument is expressed by Wilfredo Plata (2010, 257), who proclaims that 
the Bolivian process towards autonomies is “a ‘positive innovation’ that deepens popular 
participation...in territories traditionally inhabited by indigenous peoples” (author’s 
translation).  Thus, by allowing meaningful participation to previously marginalized 
groups, indigenous autonomy has the potential to deepen democracy.  Brysk (2000, 285) 
also makes a case in support of indigenous autonomy when she states, “Self-
determination is the legitimating rationale of democracy, which modern republics provide 
through indirect representation in national decision-making bodies.  But if such 
representation is systematically inadequate for distinct nationalities within the state, 
democracy must provide supplementary forms or face chronic delegitimation.”  In 
Bolivia’s case, indigenous autonomy serves as a supplementary form of representation 
and, according to Brysk’s argument, helps to legitimate democracy. 
I label these arguments that indigenous autonomy aids decentralization, promotes 
popular participation or creates a supplementary form of representation for marginalized 
peoples “citizenship arguments.”  Citizenship arguments assume that the recognition of 
indigenous autonomy leads to X, and X makes citizenship more meaningful, thus, 
deepening democracy.  Citizenship can be considered meaningful when the exercise of 
citizens’ rights is efficient.  By “efficient” I mean that, when citizens make a request or 
demand, their voices are heard and the government is responsive to the needs and desires 
citizens express.  If a group of citizens’ voices are not heard because of lack of 
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representation, insufficient mechanisms for participation or because authority is too 
centralized, causing local concerns to be overlooked, citizens are unable to exercise their 
civic rights in an efficient way, the idea of citizenship becomes empty, and democracy 
becomes superficial.  Though citizenship arguments make sense logically, they fail to 
take into account the meaning of citizenship within indigenous communities.  Ideas of 
citizenship, democracy and the state within these communities tend to be at odds with 
liberal democracy, which I will discuss in the following section. 
 
The Counterargument 
 
Though some scholars argue that indigenous autonomy leads to more meaningful 
citizenship, in turn, deepening democracy, others suggest that citizenship is not 
meaningful for all members of indigenous communities under usos y costumbres political 
system.  As Eisenstadt (2007, 63) notes with respect to Oaxaca, Mexico’s usos y 
costumbres municipalities, “18 percent allow no participation by women whatsoever, and 
21 percent are known to systematically forbid the participation of citizens living outside 
of the cabecera, or municipal “seat,” where decisions tend to be made.”  This constitutes 
the exclusion of sections of the citizenry within the community, limiting the citizenship 
of these members.  Instances of minority exclusion can also be cited in Bolivia and a few 
will be explored later in this paper using the case of Jesús de Machaca. 
Minorities may not only be denied participation; they are also often denied 
sufficient representation.  Because of the way that usos y costumbres function, indigenous 
autonomies suffer problems in representing all relevant sectors (i.e., women, youth, and 
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Spanish-speaking monolinguals) (Brysk 2000, 298).  Women are especially 
underrepresented in Guaraní communities that utilize the capitanía system since 
communal and intra-communal leaders can only be men.  On a national level, the central 
government has taken great strides in improving gender equality in the political sphere.  
Not only is gender equality mentioned generally throughout the constitution, the Electoral 
Code (Law Nº. 1984) also sets gender quotas for the positions of senator, deputy, prefect, 
mayor, town council and agente cantonal.  The Electoral Code requires that at least one 
out of every four candidates for senator in each department be female, one out of every 
three candidates for deputy in each department be female, and that 30 percent of the lists 
for prefects, mayors, town councils, and agentes cantonales in their totality be comprised 
of female candidates.  Therefore, existing indigenous political systems are not only in 
opposition to liberal democracy for excluding women, they are also in violation of the 
national Constitution and laws. 
Although the recognition of indigenous autonomy by the central government may 
promote the rights of indigenous peoples as a group, within this group more than half of 
its members continue to be excluded, in some cases.  Because of discrimination against 
minorities and women (a disadvantaged majority rather than a minority), citizenship is 
not deepened for these sectors and they remain disenfranchised.  For this reason, the 
implementation of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia is unlikely to improve the quality of 
democracy in the country. 
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The Decentralization Argument and Counterargument 
 
Another argument in support of the theory that indigenous autonomy deepens 
democracy relies on the previously discussed argument that indigenous autonomy aids in 
the decentralization of the state and contends that “political forms that permit or 
encourage acting locally are more democratic” (Brysk 2000, 286).  Indigenous autonomy 
encourages acting locally by making local elections of indigenous authorities, employing 
usos y costumbres or other customary practices, significant and official channels of 
participation and, hence, following this theory, should be more democratic.  Larry 
Diamond (1999, 121-122) argues that decentralization improves the quality of democracy 
in five ways: (1) it aids in the development of democratic values and skills among the 
citizenry; (2) it heightens the accountability and responsiveness of politicians to local 
interests; (3) it “provides additional channels of access to power for historically 
marginalized groups and this improves the representativeness of democracy,” which is 
especially pertinent in the case of indigenous autonomy; (4) it improves political checks 
and balances; and (5) it increases political competition. 
Nevertheless, Donna Lee Van Cott (2008) makes a strong counterargument 
against the claim that decentralization necessarily improves the quality of democracy.  
This argument applies to the Bolivian case, specifically.  Van Cott (2008) posits that 
decentralization can improve the quality of democracy vis-à-vis democratic institutional 
reforms.  However, this is only true when “the impetus for their adoption comes from 
municipal actors” (Van Cott 2008, 4).  This is in contrast to a top-down dynamic, “in 
which national-level leaders initiate decentralization and design and impose uniform 
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subnational institutions throughout the territory” (Van Cott 2008, 4).  Van Cott (2008, 5) 
argues that a top-down approach is not effective in improving the quality of democracy 
because “[c]itizens are less likely to identify with imposed institutions... [a]nd imported 
institutions are less likely to address the particular governance problems of a locality 
without the input of local actors.”  For these reason, top-down decentralization reforms 
are unlikely to result in the deepening of democracy. 
Bolivia’s decentralization process represents a strictly top-down approach, 
beginning with the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) designed and implemented 
by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and which imposed a rigid, universal model on 
Bolivia’s then-327 diverse municipalities.  This top-down approach has continued with 
the implementation of indigenous autonomy, which was originally conceived of by 
intellectuals of the MAS party and, thus, is a “proposal born outside of the [indigenous] 
social movement” (Zibechi 2010, 118, emphasis original).  It was then written into law in 
the Ley de Autonomía y Descentralización by a MAS-dominated Congress, giving 
indigenous groups little if any input on the details of indigenous autonomy, as I will 
explore in greater detail in the fifth chapter.  Thus, because of the way that it has been 
implemented, indigenous autonomy is unlikely to deepen democracy, regardless of the 
inherent problematic elements present in different forms of customary, indigenous 
political systems. 
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Additional Tensions Between Usos y Costumbres and Liberal Democracy 
 
Most important for the purpose of this section are the democratic conditions of 
free and fair elections, the right of all adults to vote, the right to run for office, and the 
right to form independent organizations and associations (especially political parties).  
Indigenous communities that employ usos y costumbres generally violate a combination 
of these conditions.  One of the greatest sticking points in the international debate over 
indigenous autonomy is the use of public voting in many usos y costumbres systems.  
Eisenstadt (2007, 63) states that, of the indigenous municipalities in Oaxaca, “81 percent 
violate the secret ballot.”  Public voting is also employed in Bolivia’s indigenous 
communities.  This practice is seen to violate the condition of free elections. 
Public voting in indigenous political systems makes it impossible to ensure free 
elections.  Voters may be influenced by the long line they see behind a candidate, even 
though they had not yet decided for whom to vote.  Additionally, voters may feel 
pressured or even threatened to vote with their friends, family members, or employers, 
since everyone present will be a witness to their vote, rather than being able to cast their 
vote for the candidate of their choosing in secret and later claim to have voted in 
solidarity with the others.  Finally, if voters resist such influences and stand behind an 
unpopular candidate, they may later be marginalized by the community or punished by 
the winning candidate.  In Oaxaca, Mexico, for example, high levels of post-electoral 
conflict are noted in usos y costumbres municipalities and may be due in part to the use 
of public voting (Eisenstadt 2007). 
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The importance of the secret ballot for democracy has been recognized for more 
than a century in the United States.  Scholars argue that the Australian ballot, as the secret 
ballot form of voting is often called, prevents vote buying (Anderson and Tollison 1988; 
Converse 1972; Crook and Crook 2007; Heckelman 1995; Rusk 1974; Wigmore 1889) as 
well as voter intimidation and coercion (Crook and Crook 2007; Heckleman 1995; 
Wigmore 1889).  Coercion could come from landlords, trade unions, employers, family, 
friends, or clients (Wigmore 1889).  There are even stories of voters being threatened, 
kidnapped and killed under democratic public voting systems (Harris 1929; 1934).  The 
secret ballot eliminates the ability to verify how a voter cast his or her vote, thereby 
removing the temptation of bribery or intimidation and violent reactions to voters’ 
decisions.  The secret ballot allows the voter to express his or her personal interests at the 
polls without interference or fear of reprisal.  In that way, the secret ballot “secures...a 
free and honest expression of the convictions of every citizen” (Wigmore 1889, 32).  In 
other words, the secret ballot aids in ensuring that elections are truly free. 
Nevertheless, two counterarguments can and have been made.  First, scholars 
have argued that the secret ballot can exclude illiterate minorities (Crook and Crook 
2007; Heckelman and Yates 2002).  This argument is especially pointed at the exclusion 
of black voters during the United States’ transfer to a secret ballot system starting in 
1884.  However, this issue is especially concerning in a country where 13.2 percent of the 
population is illiterate (Census 2001).  This figure is even higher in Bolivia’s autonomous 
districts, only three of which score better than the national average.  In the indigenous 
autonomy of Tarabuco, for example, illiteracy is extremely high at 52.7 percent (Census 
2001).  Another counterargument, which is made by many of Bolivia’s indigenous groups 
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specifically, is that the secret ballot allows for fraud, while public elections are more 
transparent since no one person can physically be in two lines at the same time (making 
voter fraud impossible) and everyone is present to witness which candidate receives the 
most voter support.  Furthermore, some communities argue that they are not protected 
from external pressures by the secret ballot.  This is because many communities seek 
patronage projects collectively and, thus, if the majority of the community votes against 
the target candidate, the results will be published in the electoral tallies and the 
community will be punished as a unit, even though the choices of individual voters 
remain anonymous. 
The right of all adults to vote in elections is also frequently breached in usos y 
costumbres communities.  As discussed earlier, in Oaxacan indigenous municipalities, 
women and those living outside of the community seat may be banned from voting.  This 
is clearly in tension with liberal democracy, which term cannot be conceded today 
without universal suffrage.  If indigenous political systems are to exist within the modern 
Bolivian state, any limits on suffrage to community members would need to be lifted.  
However, since these limits would have likely been put into place for logical reasons on 
the part of community authorities and members, this would likely be a contentious 
adjustment for affected communities. 
The right of nearly all adults to run for eligible offices has been the topic of much 
heated debate in Bolivia.  Because indigenous political systems often require community 
authorities to pass through a series of positions before arriving at the ranks of supreme 
authority and real influence, educated young adults are blocked from posts for which they 
would otherwise be qualified.  In Aymara communities, this system is called the thakhi, 
  48 
literally path, which a person passes through during the course of his life, fulfilling 
various responsibilities in both the communal and familial spheres (CEBEM 2009, 30). 
In effect, this system not only violates democratic rights of citizens, it can also 
create a kind of human capital flight, where those most qualified for high ranking 
positions in the community leave to seek positions with the central government, since 
there is little opportunity in their own communities.  As Eisenstadt (2007, 66) describes 
it,  
Young people with university educations rarely return to their usos y 
costumbres villages... because they will have to spend up to one third of their 
lives serving in generalist cargos rather than utilizing professional training, and 
in extreme cases, young accountants and lawyers may have to serve as errand-
runner topils for semiliterate and illiterate mayors who are unable to fill out 
municipal expenditure spreadsheets or interpret local ordinances, but who 
patiently spent decades scaling the hierarchy of cargos. 
 
 This results in the deterioration of democracy locally, since candidate options are 
limited.  The hierarchical emphasis of the system is something else that will have to be 
changed if usos y costumbres are to be incorporated into Bolivia’s larger democratic 
system.  It will also be a polemic change since indigenous communities have strong 
reasons for adhering to thakhi-like systems, principally that experience with the 
community is important for building a base of moral authority and understanding the 
internal working of the community’s political system. 
 Finally, the right to form political parties in indigenous political system has been 
an issue specific to Bolivia.  This has been an issue in both Bolivia and Mexico, where 
parties were prohibited from operating in usos municipalities with less than 5,000 people 
(Hiskey and Goodman Forthcoming).  Though there is no state-imposed law in Bolivia, 
some indigenous communities in that country (most notably Jesús de Machaca, where the 
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ruling MAS party has previously had hegemony) seek to eradicate political parties.  The 
authorities of Jesús de Machaca publicly state their intentions and their reasons behind 
these intentions: “we cannot and should not continue sharing the process of our own 
autonomy with other political parties in light of the fact that, even if the councilors are 
our own Machaqueño brothers, they obey and will always obey their political party 
bosses” (CEBEM 2009, 75, author’s translation).  Eisenstadt (2007) makes an additional 
relevant argument surrounding political parties.  To compare the Mexican case to the 
Bolivian case again, Eisenstadt (2007, 66) claims that “parties... need to continue to 
operate if usos y costumbres municipalities are to influence state-wide and national races 
where customary law does not apply.”  Therefore, eradication of political parties, though 
possibly enriching democracy at the local level, may be detrimental to democracy at the 
national level by restricting indigenous peoples from gaining national representation. 
 Many scholars recognize the importance of parties for democracy (Alcántara Sáez 
and Freidenberg 2001; Levitsky 2001; Mainwaring 1999; McGuire 1997; Van Cott 
2008).  A weak party system is associated with “high levels of electoral volatility, the rise 
of personalistic or neo-populist leaderships, policy instability, low accountability, and 
poor representation of popular sector interests” (Mainwaring 1999 via Levitsky 2001, 
96).  This is because parties act as a channel of participation in democracies.  Thus, when 
parties are weak, fragmented or altogether absent, elites may choose to subvert 
democracy rather than preserve it in order to fulfill their interests (McGuire 1997).  
Additionally, in the absence of parties, “[i]ndividual politicians bec[o]me the main 
vehicle for representation; this pattern favor[s] powerful elites with connections to those 
politicians” (Mainwaring 1999, 6).  This leads to a loss of representation for the majority 
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of the citizenry, leaving democracy hollow.  Moreover, without functional parties, 
political leaders must resort to patronage in order to gain political support (Mainwaring 
1999), thus eroding the quality of democracy.  The importance of parties for democracy 
in the face of some indigenous communities’ desire to exclude parties from the political 
process implies a fundamental tension between indigenous autonomy and liberal 
democracy. 
 A final argument showing the tension between usos y costumbres and liberal 
democracy is the frightening observation that voter turnout for national elections has 
dropped for usos y costumbres municipalities in Mexico in recent years (Eisenstadt 2007, 
66; Hiskey and Goodman Forthcoming).  There are several reasons for this voter decline 
in Mexico.  Hiskey and Goodman (Forthcoming) blame both clientelism on the part of 
the state and specific features of indigenous political systems that demote citizen 
participation on local and national levels.  First, with reference to state clientelism, the 
dominant PRI party in Mexico historically offered indigenous municipalities clientelistic 
benefits and the right to maintain their traditions, motivating voters to participate in 
elections and to vote for the PRI (Hiskey and Goodman Forthcoming).  Thus, voters in 
indigenous municipalities were motivated to vote for non-democratic reasons and, when 
the PRI was no longer able to provide the same economic benefits and usos y costumbres 
were formally recognized, indigenous citizens had no incentive to go to the polls. 
 Second, on a local level, certain features of usos y costumbres systems in the 
Mexican case suppress participation, including exclusion from the political process based 
on age and gender (Hiskey and Goodman Forthcoming).  This exclusion becomes 
customary and is replicated on the national level simply because certain groups have not 
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developed a habit of participating in the political system.  Finally, certain features of usos 
y costumbres systems isolate citizens from national-level politics, even though they might 
not discourage participation on the local level.  One cause of isolation is the absence of 
political parties in many usos municipalities.  As mentioned before, in Mexico, political 
parties are banned in usos communities of less than 5,000 people, a law that affects 85 
percent of all usos municipalities in Mexico (Hiskey and Goodman Forthcoming).  
Without any political organization tying local political systems to national systems, 
indigenous citizens become isolated and disengaged with national-level politics, 
eliminating their democratic voice on the national stage. 
The same phenomenon of reduced voter turnout in indigenous autonomies could 
result in Bolivia due to exclusionary practices on the local level or due to the eviction of 
political parties from indigenous autonomies.  Bolivia’s highland autonomies are 
especially at risk for this latter possibility.  The risk that the pattern of decreased voter 
turnout in Mexico could repeat itself in Bolivia is worrisome since it would ultimately be 
damaging to the quality of democracy in the country. 
 In the same vein, this exclusion from national politics can lead to authoritarian 
enclaves at the local level.  As Allyson Benton (2006) explains, local leaders may be able 
to perpetuate their authoritarian control over their communities through political isolation 
and by undermining universal suffrage and/or the secret ballot in order to exclude 
opponents and manipulate electoral outcomes in their favor.  This has been especially 
problematic in usos y costumbres municipalities in Mexico, as demonstrated by the 
exaggerated winning margins of first-place parties and candidates in these communities 
(Benton 2006).  This has the potential to repeat itself in Bolivia’s indigenous autonomies 
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if political parties are eliminated, voting is public and the eligibility rules for candidacy 
remains strict.  By reducing political competition at the local level, political hegemony 
under a select few individuals could easily result in indigenous autonomy undermining 
democracy in these communities and provoking greater exclusion from the national 
democratic system for a group of citizens that has already suffered political exclusion 
across Bolivian history. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I argued that indigenous autonomy in the Bolivian case has two 
sets of fatal flaws that prevent this reform from deepening democracy in the country.  The 
first set of flaws is inherent to indigenous political systems.  The second set of flaws 
comes from the way in which indigenous autonomy was implemented in Bolivia by the 
central government. 
In order to formulate my claims, I examined several scholarly arguments in 
agreement and in disagreement with the theory that indigenous autonomy serves to 
deepen democracy.  Arguments in support of this idea are based on two separate tenets: 
(1) indigenous autonomy makes citizenship more meaningful, in turn deepening 
democracy, or (2) indigenous autonomy aids in political decentralization, which improves 
the quality of democracy.  Each of these arguments was accompanied by its respective 
counterargument.  The first argued that intrinsic features of indigenous political systems 
erode citizenship rights and power.  The second argued that the top-down approach to 
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decentralization and indigenous autonomy in Bolivia has undermined the ability of this 
process to deepen democracy. 
Additionally, I included arguments against public voting practices and the 
limitation of suffrage in some indigenous political systems.  I showed that the right of 
nearly every adult citizen to run for office and the right to form political parties, both 
crucial for effective democratic representation, are often violated in indigenous political 
systems.  Finally, I shared Allyson Benton’s argument that usos y costumbres systems 
can exhibit authoritarian tendencies, weakening political competition and democratic 
legitimacy at the local level. 
In the following chapter, I will use two case studies to exemplify the inherent 
characteristics of indigenous political systems that conflict with liberal democracy.  Then, 
I will move on to explore the problems with the implementation of indigenous autonomy 
in Bolivia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
COMMUNAL DEMOCRACY VS. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: 
A TWO-CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 Indigenous political systems in Bolivia do not exist unchanged since pre-
Colombian times.  Rather, they have been shaped by the course of history.  As with all 
human organizations, they have been subject to the same evolutionary processes.  Though 
indigenous groups have often been painted as “timeless,” they are very much the product 
of time’s passage.  Before the conquest by the Spanish, several indigenous groups within 
Bolivia’s contemporary borders were conquered by other indigenous nations.  The 
Aymara assimilated most of the Uru nation; the Guaraní enslaved the Chané people; and 
the Inca expanded their empire deep into the valleys of Cochabamba.  The arrival of the 
Spanish resulted in the eventual breakdown of traditional indigenous political systems in 
most parts of Bolivia. 
In the 18th century, the kurakas (Quechua) and caciques (Aymara) suffered a 
crisis of legitimacy (see Stern 1993).  These leaders became the middlemen between 
indigenous populations and encomenderos seeking to collect tribute.  However, 
indigenous peoples received nothing in return from their leaders or from the 
encomenderos, and kurakas/caciques began to abuse their positions of power for personal 
benefit.  Eventually, with the advent of required labor in the mines, the situation came to 
a breaking point.  Indigenous peoples refused to recognize their traditional leaders’ 
authority and Andean political visions imploded.  The result in Aymara and Quechua 
communities was a shift towards elected leadership rather than inherited leadership and a 
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new belief that the people should be the ultimate authority in a community rather than a 
royal family.  The renovated system was then overlaid by the sindicato system introduced 
during the 1953 Agrarian Reform (see Orta 2004).  All of these events have formed 
current indigenous political systems across the Bolivian highlands.  Indigenous political 
systems in the lowlands have likewise been changed by historical situations and external 
actors.  Nevertheless, indigenous communities have maintained parastatal forms of 
government and have fought to have those systems recognized by the central government 
as part of their right to self-determination. 
Until now, I have mainly discussed indigenous autonomy in broad terms, without 
paying specific attention to Bolivian forms.  In this chapter, I will provide two case 
studies of indigenous communities in Bolivia, both of which have now declared and been 
granted indigenous autonomy.  I will begin by outlining the usos y costumbres political 
system of Jesús de Machaca, an Aymara indigenous autonomy at the western extreme of 
Bolivia.  Then, I will move to the other side of the country to discuss a very different 
form of indigenous government called the capitanía as it is employed by the Izozog-
Guaraní.  In each case, I will highlight specific features of these political systems that are 
contentious for democracy as I defined it in the previous chapter.  Then, I will explore 
possibilities for reducing the tensions between liberal democracy and these two systems.  
Ultimately, I believe that the marriage between liberal democracy and indigenous 
political systems will be difficult at best. 
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The Machaqueño Experiment 
 
Historical Background of Jesús de Machaca 
Jesús de Machaca is a municipality located within the Ingavi province, in the 
department of La Paz, near Lake Titicaca.  According to the 2001 Census, 13,427 people 
reside within its borders and 95.7 percent of them claim indigenous identity, with 94.4 
percent claiming Aymara indigenous identity, specifically (Plata 2010, 251).  Jesús de 
Machaca was originally composed of twelve ayllus (now twenty-four) plus two cacical 
haciendas: Chhijchha, which is communal land for use by the twelve ayllus, and Qurpa, 
which serves to sustain those in service to Jesús de Machaca’s church. 
Jesús de Machaca is historically important for being the site of the killing of 
neighboring Caquiaviri’s corregidor8 in 1771 and additional uprisings, culminating in the 
massacre of 1921 (e.g., see Thomson 2002; Orta 2004).  In 1921, the Aymara cacique of 
Jesús de Machaca, Faustino Llanqui, had already appealed in vain to the prefect of La 
Paz protesting the selection of the abusive and excessive Lucio T. Estrada as corregidor.  
Llanqui finally decided to take a more aggressive stance with the support of community 
members.  On March 12, 1921, the ayllus of Jesús de Machaca organized under Llanqui 
to resist the abuses of their corregidor, burning him and his family in their home and 
killing twelve other non-indigenous community members.  Though the actions of the 
Machaqueños in this instance were extremely violent, the incident constituted a push for 
greater autonomy from the central government on the part of Jesús de Machaca’s 
indigenous population in terms of the community’s right to decide its own political                                                         
8 The corregidores, usually creoles or mestizos assigned by the state, replaced the caciques during the 
Republican era. 
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representation.  Additionally, the massacre symbolized the resuscitation of the supreme 
authority of the Aymara cacique, who was seen as more legitimate than the corregidor's 
by indigenous peoples. 
Demands for greater community autonomy were finally answered in 2002 when 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada established Jesús de Machaca, previously 
incorporated with the municipality of Viacha, as a state-sanctioned municipality.  This 
granted the new municipality state funding and greater control over local politics.  In the 
2004 municipal elections, taking advantage of its greater level of autonomy, Jesus de 
Machaca’s Cabildo decided to carry out elections for the mayor and municipal councilors 
using usos y costumbres prior to the state-sanctioned elections.  Community members 
were expected to then respect the decision of the community when casting their secret 
ballot in the state-based election.  The Cabildo especially sought to exclude political 
parties from the process, since political parties would undermine the autonomy the 
community was trying to create (Cameron 2009; CEBEM 2009). 
The Cabildo divided the 24-ayllu marka9 into 5 regions of similar population size.  
Each region would then elect one candidate for municipal council and each person would 
confirm his or her region’s vote in the official elections.  Residents were not to vote 
independently after a community-wide decision had been made.  Moreover, candidates 
who lost in the usos y costumbres elections were not to run on the state-sanctioned ballot.  
This system would ensure that each region was represented equally, something that was 
not guaranteed by Bolivia’s system of municipal elections.  The Cabildo would select the 
candidate for mayor, and community members were, once again, expected to uphold this                                                         
9 The ayllu is a collection of communities and the marka is the territorial whole, which includes 
all of the ayllus of that territory.  Jesús de Machaca is a marka comprising 24 ayllus. 
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decision in the official elections regardless of their personal opinions. 
The Cabildo set strict eligibility requirements for potential municipal councilors 
and mayors.  Municipal council candidates were required to have held the position of 
mallku10 in their community, and candidates for the position of mayor had to have held 
the position of jiliri jach’a mallku of the marka, the highest authority of the marka and 
the leader of the Cabildo.  Though the Cabildo stressed the necessity of generational and 
gender equality in the elections, the requirements for mayor excluded women, youth and 
non-members of the community (Cameron 2009, 167).  The exclusion of women as 
potential candidates is noticeably anti-democratic.  However, in this case, the Cabildo 
was obligated to allot for two female candidates due to the state’s requirement that a 
proportion of all candidates be women. 
Jesús de Machaca’s usos y costumbres for candidate selection consist of 
community members publicly lining up behind the candidate of their choice.  This public 
method is used because it is seen as more transparent and less prone to fraud than the 
secret ballot, though some critics assert that it can lead to voter intimidation as already 
discussed.  The votes are then counted by a commission, consisting of the Municipal 
Mayor, the President of the Municipal Council, and the Surveillance Committee, each 
with the help of two aids. 
In 2004, “the carefully negotiated process for the pre-election of candidates within 
MACOJMA was undermined by the entrance into the electoral competition of two 
community members who were unhappy with the candidate selection process and who 
asserted their individual rights to contest elections in affiliation with the MAS party”                                                         
10 In this case, mallku denotes the head of a community. 
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(Cameron 2009, 167).  These two members appeared on the official ballot in the state-
sanctioned elections as candidates from the MAS party.  They gained enough votes in 
that election to win positions on the municipal council.  As a result, two of five of the 
ayllu regions had no representation in the municipal council.  The MAS councilors were 
punished by expulsion from the Cabildo and marginalization within the municipal 
council.  In spite of these problems, this was a major step for Jesús de Machaca in staking 
claim to its de facto autonomy from the state.  This autonomy was legitimized on 
December 6, 2009, when Jesús de Machaca became among the first indigenous 
municipalities to elect a system of autonomous government. 
 
Points of Contention 
Jesús de Machaca’s experience of trying to exercise autonomy within the nation 
reflects several minor divergences between the community’s political vision and liberal 
democracy.  These more minor issues can be solved without disrupting the integrity of 
Jesús de Machaca’s traditional political system, but they must be cleared up for Jesús de 
Machaca as an indigenous autonomy to be fully compatible with the Bolivian democratic 
system. 
The first tension has already been discussed at length and it is that of gender 
inequality.  Though authority in Jesús de Machaca revolves around the idea of chacha-
warmi (the male-female unit) and men lead in conjunction with their wives, according to 
one ex-jach’a mallku tayka (the wife of the supreme authority of the marka), the mallku 
taykas (as the female authorities are called) rarely participate in meetings or are not paid 
any attention (Tapia 2009, 46).  Jesús de Machaca also emphasized gender equality 
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during the 2004 municipal elections, but machismo is still the rule, and women are 
expected to serve the food rather than take an active role in leadership meetings.   
In addition to the gender issue, there is also the problem of the Iruhito Uru11 
minority in Jesús de Machaca, an Aymara indigenous autonomy that also includes a small 
non-Aymara indigenous group.  The Urus make up just a single ayllu, Hiroito Urus, and 
constitute no more than 1.31% of Jesús de Machaca’s population (as deduced from tables 
provided in Plata 2010).  Historically, the Urus became more and more concentrated onto 
smaller and smaller parcels of land of what is today Jesús de Machaca by Aymara 
encroachers.  Finally, part of the Uru population opted for integration with the Aymara 
and became part of the Janq’u Jaqi ayllu.  The remaining Urus resisted integration at the 
cost of marginalization.  As a result, the Iruhito Uru ayllu “has never come to integrate 
itself into the twelve-ayllu system on equal conditions”12 (Ticona 2009, 55, author’s 
translation). 
Differences in language (the Uru speak Uchumataqu), traditions and culture 
between the Aymara and the Uru isolate the latter from the rest of the municipality as a 
group.  This inevitably affects their possibilities for representation at the municipal level, 
although through the rotational system a representative from the ayllu becomes jach’a 
mallku every 19 years.13  Jesús de Machaca could minimize the marginalization of the 
Urus by allowing them overrepresentation within the marka.  For example, a spot on the                                                         
11 Alternatively spelled Hiroito Urus (from Jesús de Machaca’s Programa Operativo Anual 2008, 
found in CEBEM 2009, 102) 
12 Here, the 12-ayllu system refers to what is today the 26-ayllu system.  Originally, Jesús de 
Machaca was composed of 12 ayllus only. 
13 In reality, Jesús de Machaca is composed of two markas. The Arax Suxta consists of 7 ayllus 
and the Aynacha Suxta consists of 19 ayllus, one of the 19 being the ayllu Hiroito Urus.  Jach’a 
mallkus for each marka are rotated every year, so each ayllu of the Aynacha Suxta is represented 
at the highest level of the marka every 19 years. 
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municipal council could be reserved for an Uru councilor.  If it is necessary to have only 
five councilors on the municipal council, the other 25 ayllus could be broken up into four 
regions, similar to what was done in the 2004 municipal elections. 
Another tension emerges from Jesús de Machaca’s desire to eradicate the 
influence and existence of political parties within the municipality.  In a lengthy report 
produced by Jesús de Machaca’s municipal government and Cabildo, one indigenous 
leader argues that the presence of political parties in community elections would 
jeopardize the authority of the people over their leader, putting the interests of “political 
party bosses” over those of the community (CEBEM 2009, 75).  Though it is 
understandable that the indigenous authorities of Jesús de Machaca may want to limit 
external forces from intruding in local politics, since this could be seen as a threat to 
indigenous autonomy, the Cabildo should not suppress the organization of community 
members.  Theoretically, there is no reason why local political parties should not exist.  
In fact, the formation of community-based political parties may help to promote a more 
active civil society and better-informed citizens within the indigenous autonomy, who 
can make an impact on local and national democracy. 
It is vital to note that Jesús de Machaca’s experience with autonomy also reveals 
some irreconcilable differences between the community’s political system and the 
Bolivian state’s political system.  These differences are more serious because they are 
such that, in order to ease the tension between these two systems, one would have to 
change fundamentally, and it would mostly likely be indigenous political systems that 
suffered rather the national political system.  These are the problems that make 
indigenous autonomy not just democratically questionable, but in fact result in an 
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incompatibility where indigenous autonomy and liberal democracy may be unable to 
coexist in their pure forms.  
The first issue is actually a problem of democratic governance and has to do with 
leadership rotation.  Leaders at all levels of the Jesús de Machaca marka are rotated 
annually.  Even though the regular replacement of leaders is essential to democracy, the 
frequency with which it occurs in Jesús de Machaca makes it impossible for executive 
and legislative bodies to acquire any institutional memory from which they may draw 
upon and improve future leadership.  It is also limiting for individual leaders since they 
are unable to accumulate the experience necessary to be effective in their negotiations 
with government and non-government bodies beyond the communities.  With this 
system, not only is the quality of democracy degraded by preventing individual from 
becoming effective, democratic leaders, but without the hope for re-election within a 
decade or two, leaders are likely to be less responsive to citizens’ demands and may 
abuse the system when it is their turn, instead of promoting communal well-being. 
Additionally, a lack of experience and technical understanding leads to confusion 
and ineffectiveness in the communication between leaders and community members.  
Autonomy brings with it state regulations, for example, which require legal knowledge to 
be fully understood.  Because the issues discussed at the Cabildo meetings are becoming 
more complex with greater autonomy, it makes it more difficult for leaders to keep their 
communities informed.  John Cameron (2009, 162) argues that this breakdown in 
communication “is problematic when viewed through the liberal lens of participatory 
democracy, which places high value on the active involvement of individuals in decision-
making.”  Therefore, ill-informed citizens lead to a weak democracy. 
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While the previous system of communication between leaders and citizens has 
functioned in the past, now that the community’s traditional authorities come into 
continuous contact with the state, one of two things will have to change.  The methods for 
disseminating information may need to change, perhaps by hiring a highly educated 
community member to keep the minutes at Cabildo meetings and then distribute copies 
throughout the community to keep citizens informed.  Otherwise, the community will 
have to change the experience and education requirements for those eligible to be 
Cabildo members.  If one of these changes does not occur, indigenous autonomy in the 
context of the state system will result in weak local-level democracy. 
Finally, the entire thakhi system is troublesome for democratic ideals.  This 
system stresses the importance of hierarchy, as described early, and requires community 
members to progress through a series of increasingly influential positions during the 
course of their lives.  No amount of technical knowledge exempts an individual from the 
obligation to start at the bottom of the ladder.  This excludes young people from decision-
making position at all levels of the marka, regardless of their achievements in formal 
education or their political experience outside of the marka.  A negative side effect of this 
exclusion, which already goes against basic conditions for liberal democracy, may be a 
weakened democratic system at the local level if high-level leaders do not have the 
necessary technical knowledge to effectively respond to citizens’ demands. 
Because these latter tensions are institutional and integral to Jesús de Machaca’s 
political system, the system will be distorted by its incorporation into the Bolivian 
democratic state.  What changes must occur for usos y costumbres systems to be 
acceptable within a democratic context?  What will these changes mean for indigenous 
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autonomy?  I now turn to answer these questions.  
 
Making Indigenous Autonomy Fit 
In order for Jesús de Machaca’s indigenous political system and liberal 
democracy to coexist harmoniously within the same state, some changes must occur.  
Xavier Albó, a resident of Jesús de Machaca himself, argues that “the ayllu-based system 
of governance needs to adapt to the new political context created by municipal 
decentralization” (Cameron 2009, 169).  This adaptation would mainly include changes 
to the thakhi and rotational systems.  The thakhi would need to open up to the possibility 
of leadership based on expertise and merit, and not just hierarchy and rotation.  This 
would help to liberalize democracy within Jesús de Machaca by allowing all members the 
equal right to run for eligible offices and, ideally, providing the community with higher 
quality leadership. 
Additionally, the system of rotation would have to be altered to allow community 
leaders to hold their posts for longer periods of time.  Jesús de Machaca’s experience 
during the period following the 2004 elections demonstrated that the annual rotation of 
leaders was counter-productive to the acquisition of technical knowledge and the 
experience necessary for effective democratic leadership.  Moreover, it created a 
challenge to the Cabildo’s ability to oversee the municipal council, where councilors 
have a 5-year mandate, compared to cabildo members’ yearlong mandate (Cameron 
2009, 168-169), and where outside political parties may have a presence and would need 
to be held accountable by the marka.  In order to resolve this issue, the marka could 
allow leaders to assume their responsibilities for the same amount of time as the 
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municipal councilors. 
A special dilemma arises when proposing this change; Jesús de Machaca’s 
political system requires that “leaders assume the financial costs associated with their 
positions as a mechanism for slowing socio-economic differentiation” (Cameron 2009, 
170).  While this practice may reduce economic inequality in the community, it greatly 
limits the possibility for extended periods of leadership by one individual or family.  The 
marka would need to generate sufficient funds to ease the financial burden of leadership 
in order for leaders to assume longer mandates and resolve the problems resulting from 
annual rotation. 
 
The Capitanía Of The Izoceño-Guaraní 
 
 The Izoceño-Guaraní Indians, also known as Chiriguanos, are part of the Tupí-
Guaraní linguistic family.  They constitute 24 communities in the Izozog region, 
composed of approximately 9,000 people (Hirsch 1999, 64), on the banks of the Parapetí 
River in the indigenous autonomy of Charagua, located in the department of Santa Cruz.  
Within eastern Bolivia, the Tupí-Guaraní are united under the Confederation of Bolivia’s 
Indigenous Peoples (CIDOB) along with numerous other lowland indigenous groups.  
The former indigenous leader of the Izoceño-Guaraní, Bonifacio Barrientos Iyambae, 
founded the organization and it is now widely recognized, nationally and internationally, 
as the representative organ of Bolivia’s lowland indigenous peoples.  The Guaraní as a 
collective unit tend to be more united in their decision-making processes than the 
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Aymara.14  This strength of theirs has been key in advancing the fight for indigenous 
autonomy nationally and has created the largest indigenous autonomy to date in Bolivia 
(Charagua), even though only 55 percent of the municipality’s population identifies as 
indigenous (Ministerio de Autonomía).15 
Haciendas and non-governmental organizations have greatly shaped the politics 
of the Izoceño-Guaraní.  First, the Izoceños suffered from land invasions by white 
ranchers during the nineteenth century and were then forced to work on the newly created 
haciendas for lack of their own land.  Therefore, the recuperation of land rights has been 
extremely important in the Izoceño-Guaraní’s push for autonomy.  In addition to non-
indigenous ranchers, NGOs have been present in the region for decades now.  The 
Izoceño-Guaraní have used these organizations to their benefit, making contact with them 
and then manipulating their relationship with the NGOs to obtain necessary resources for 
themselves. 
 
The Structure of the Hierarchy 
 The political system of the Izoceño-Guaraní, along with other Guaraní groups, is 
known as the capitanía.  This system is a result of interaction with colonial powers and 
the modern-nation state and, thus, it is not a “traditional” institution (Hirsch 1999).  
Nevertheless, it is based on indigenous political practices and was designed by the 
Guaraní people.  The system is based on hereditary and elected leadership and, like Jesús                                                         
14 In the interviews I conducted in Bolivia in June, July and August 2010, citizens and scholars alike duly 
noted that the Guaraní vote in bloc, while Aymara communities suffer from internal factions. 
15 This figure is significantly lower than all but one other autonomy (Huacaya, Bolivia’s only other Guaraní 
indigenous autonomy, is only 50 percent indigenous).  The populations of most indigenous autonomies are 
upwards of 95 percent indigenous (Tarabuco, Mojocoya, Charazani, Jesús de Machaca, San Pedro de 
Totora, Chipaya, Chayanta). 
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de Machaca, decisions are made communally (Hirsch 2003).  Unlike Jesús de Machaca, 
the capitanía does not rely on a rotative system of leadership.  Within eastern Bolivia 
there are multiple capitanías, each uniting dozens of Guaraní communities.  The Izoceño-
Guaraní specifically belong to the Capitanía de Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI).  Each 
capitanía is slightly different in its political norms, but Izozog has been lauded as a 
model of “traditional” organization (Postero 2007). 
The capitanía is composed of two types of supracommunal chiefs (mburuvicha), 
communal chiefs, elders, advisors and mayors.  The highest ruling authority is the 
mburuvichaguazu (literally the “big shadow”), or capitán grande (big chief) in Spanish.  
The mburuvichaguazu functions on a supracommunal level, linking various Guaraní 
communities.  In the CABI, this position is inherited, passed from father to son, within 
the ruling family.  This family carries the surname Iyambae, which means “without 
owner” in Guaraní (Hirsch 1999, 67).  Though not an elected position, the 
mburuvichaguazu is expected to work on his people’s behalf as a mediator in internal 
conflicts and as a public representation of his people’s interests before NGOs and the 
state.  The previous mburuvichaguazu, Bonifacio Barrientos Iyambae, held his position 
for nearly 50 years, fighting for land titles, improved socioeconomic conditions for the 
Guaraní people and the continuation of the capitanía system (Hirsch 2003).  In order to 
be successful in his function as community representative and mediator, the 
mburuvichaguazu is expected to acquire three fundamental skills: (1) oratorical ability in 
order to best communicate his people’s wishes to external organizations and authorities, 
(2) peacemaking skills in order to act as an effective mediator, and (3) courageousness 
(Hirsch 1999, 68; also, Gustafson 2009b).  In return for his service to the communities, 
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the mburuvichaguazu is exempt from communal labor and others must work his fields. 
Second in the capitanía hierarchy is the segundo capitán, followed by the 
communal chiefs.  Izozog has two segundo capitanes, one ruling over the communities of 
Alto Izozog and the other ruling over the communities of Bajo Izozog, and they are 
appointed by the mburuvichaguazu.  Below the segundo capitanes are the communal 
chiefs, who are elected annually and may be any community member able to gain 
sufficient support from the community.  While the power of the communal chiefs may be 
less than the segundo capitán and the mburuvichaguazu, it is not checked by them, but 
rather by the community members themselves. 
The capitanía also relies on yvyra ija (mayors) to disseminate information from 
the leaders throughout the villages.  Their main function is to inform every household in 
their village about the time and place of meetings, communal labor obligations and 
festivities.  Additionally, they must ensure that the people from their village attend these 
events (Hirsch 1999).  Elders are also important to the system as they function as 
counselors to the communal chiefs.  However, the mburuvichaguazu depends on the 
advice of asesores (advisors) who are younger, bilingual and more experienced with 
society beyond the Guaraní (Hirsch 1999).  Thus, the system recognizes the value of both 
age-earned wisdom and formal education. 
The mburuvichaguazu is viewed almost like a king since his authority is inherited.  
However, his opinion matters no more than any other individual in Guaraní society.  The 
Guaraní are strong proponents of individual autonomy (Hirsch 1999).  Therefore, the 
mburuvichaguazu is not allowed to amass power.  Instead, he is expected to make 
decisions based on the expressed will of his people.  The people express their interests 
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through the yemboati (assembly).  The yemboati is the most important element of the 
capitanía because it is the deliberative, judicial and executive institution of the system 
and it is the only authority over the mburuvichaguazu (Hirsch 1999).  Ultimately, the 
mburuvichaguazu must “act in accordance with the decisions made by the assembly” 
(Hirsch 1999, 71).  There are two types of assemblies: the assembly of the capitanía and 
the communal assembly.  The first is attended by the chiefs of each Izozog community to 
discuss matters pertaining to all Izoceños.  The second includes all community members 
who wish to attend (attendance is voluntary) and is used as a forum to discuss local 
matters pertaining only to a specific community (Hirsch 1999).  In both assemblies, 
decisions are made by consensus.  In other words, if any single individual is in 
disagreement with the decision made by the majority, the group must discuss the matter 
until everyone can agree. 
 
Points of Contention 
 The most obvious point of contention between the capitanía system of the 
Izoceño-Guaraní and liberal democracy is the fact that the highest position is inherited 
instead of elected.  Although this is not the case of all capitanías—the Capitanía Zona 
Cruz that encompasses communities in the vicinity of Santa Cruz city elects its 
mburuvichaguazu (Postero 2007)—this feature of the CABI is in violation of one of the 
most basic institutions of democracy: elections.  Additionally, the system of inheritance 
excludes women at the highest level of government, since the position is passed from 
father to son.  In the CABI, the segundo capitán is also an appointed position.  Though 
appointed positions exist in democracies, appointments are made by elected 
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representatives, whereas in the case of the segundo capitán, the appointment is made by a 
non-elected official, the mburuvichaguazu.  This again violates the right of citizens in a 
liberal democracy to vote. 
 Another problem that the capitanía suffers from generally, and it is a problem that 
I noted with Jesús de Machaca as well, is the public form of decision-making.  Voting is 
public and consensual in Izozog.  This means that individuals are highly vulnerable to 
coercion and intimidation by other community members.  Since a decision cannot be 
finalized without the support of the entire community, dissident members are likely to be 
coerced into agreement.  This denies citizens the right to express their political opinions 
and interests without the threat of harsh consequences, such as marginalization within the 
community, limited access to resources, and physical threats.  This is a serious tension 
since public decision-making in the form of the assembly is at the core of the Guaraní 
political vision.  A first step towards a more democratic capitanía with reference to this 
issue would be to base decision-making on a majority opinion instead of consensus.  This 
would at least allow dissidents to maintain their opinions and create less incentive for 
other community members to harass opposing individuals into agreement.  However, 
ultimately a secret ballot system would be important for making the capitanía compatible 
with liberal democracy. 
 Additionally, Charagua as a whole has a relatively large non-indigenous 
population, in comparison to other indigenous autonomies.  Thus, it will be especially 
important that the capitanía incorporate non-indigenous minorities into the system.  This 
could be complicated due to language barriers.  Mechanisms of incorporation and 
accommodation will need to be created to make sure that these groups do not face 
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discrimination or exclusion from the political process, if the capitanía is to be compatible 
with the democratic model upheld by the state. 
 Finally, it is not immediately obvious from the basic structure of the capitanía, 
but this system has suffered extensively from authoritarian abuses by different chiefs.  I 
give two examples of instances of authoritarian abuse that point to further tensions 
between the capitanía system and liberal democracy.  Though these cases did not occur 
in the CABI, they are generalizable to the capitanía system.  The first example involves 
the mburuvichaguazu of Gran Kaipependi from the early-1950s to 1986, Aurelio Aireju. 
According to Albó (1990, 130), Aireju established a “cacique-patronage scheme” 
whereby he took advantage of his position of power for his own benefit instead of acting 
in the best interest of his people.  He indulged in abuses such as forcing community 
members to provide free labor on his and his family’s land, charging informal taxes on 
community production and entering into agreements with karai (non-indigenous people) 
without consulting the community.  He also charged his community for his services as 
mburuvicha, including when he would intervene with authorities on their behalf, which 
should have been a routine responsibility of his position (Postero 2007, 96).  On top of 
the informal taxes and illegitimate charges for services rendered, he exploited his 
community members in his capacity as capitán-enganchador, the leader in charge of 
recruiting workers for the sugarcane harvest (zafra), by earning bonuses for each 
individual he recruited for the zafra.  Finally, and perhaps the most disturbing abuse 
committed by Aireju was his use of colonial punishment methods, putting people in 
stocks or even subjecting them to the socavón, where the person being punished is 
essentially buried alive, being forced to spend 15 hours in a hole in the ground (Albó 
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1990, 131).  This grand-scale corruption was allowed to continue for thirty years because 
Aireju had inherited the authority of mburuvichaguazu from his father, and his people 
were powerless to remove him. 
A second example of authoritarian abuses by a mburuvicha comes from the Bella 
Flor community, part of the Capitanía Zona Cruz, and its mburuvicha, Amalio Vega.  
Similar to Aireju, Vega used his position for personal profit and used physical force to 
maintain power (Postero 2007, 101).  Nancy Postero (2007) gives one example of his 
corrupt actions that revolves around the community’s fight for land titles.  Vega hired a 
lawyer to aid in the process without consulting the community and then forced 
community members to provide three months of labor in order to pay for the lawyer’s 
fees.  For those who refused, Vega had their names taken off the titles.  Finally, he tried 
to charge a title fee to the community members when they eventually gained rights to 
their land. 
Because of the character of the capitanía’s voting system, Vega was able to stay 
in power far longer than most of the community would have wished.  He abused his 
political and social connections to win elections through fear and intimidation.  With so 
much power in the community in social, economic and political terms, he was able to 
silence opposition.  In a public voting system, he would know which community 
members had voted against him and could then punish them socially and economically, 
just as he had done to his opposition in the case of the land grants.  The same 
phenomenon had occurred in Gran Kaipependi with Airenju.  The capitanía system 
seems to allow for strong authoritarian enclaves.  In the example of Gran Kaipependi, this 
was due to the lack of mechanisms whereby the community would be able to remove the 
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mburuvichaguazu from power, specifically the absence of elections.  In the example of 
Bella Flor, authoritarian abuses were possible due to a public voting system and the 
ability of communal leaders to rule without oversight from a higher authority.  In the 
capitanía system, the community members are meant to be the highest authority, even 
over the mburuvichaguazu.  However, if they are not free to express political dissent, that 
authority is meaningless.  Thus, public voting, the use of coercion and intimidation in 
elections, and a lack of limitations on leadership create tensions between the capitanía 
system and liberal democracy. 
The capitanía system poses serious problems for liberal democracy, just like 
Jesús de Machaca.  If the capitanía is to be recognized by the state as a legitimate 
political system, it must exist in compliance with the larger democratic system of the 
state.  For that to occur, these tensions must be ameliorated.  However, the changes that 
would have to occur would most likely be less contentious for the Izoceño-Guaraní than 
for Machaqueños as long as they were not imposed by outside authorities.  This is in part 
due to the fact that the Guaraní are more open to the participation of youth in positions of 
leadership than Jesús de Machaca and they do not follow a strict rotation of cargos, 
which has damaged governance and degraded the possibility for quality democracy in 
Jesús de Machaca.  Finally, the Izoceño-Guaraní seem to be more open to change than 
some Aymara communities, as evidenced by a recent discussion surrounding the 
inherited position of mburuvichaguazu in the CABI. 
This discussion began when it came time for the mburuvichaguazu Bonifacio 
Barrientos Iyambae to pass his authority on to his son.  However, he was hesitant about 
the appointment.  He felt that his son lacked the skills and experience to take on the 
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responsibility (Rocha Torrico 2008, 86).  Therefore, the decision fell upon the chief’s 
counselors.  There was a split in advisor opinion.  One side believed that the 
mburuvichaguazu should be chosen through public elections just like communal chiefs, 
which would break with tradition.  The other side, represented by Evangelical Christians, 
argued that the authority should be passed from father to son as in the Bible.  
Interestingly, it was the more traditional advisors who argued for a break with tradition.  
In the end, the latter argument won out and Boni Chico (as Bonifacio Barrientos 
Iyambae’s son is called) assumed his position as mburuvichaguazu.  However, in 
occupying the highest authority, the mburuvichaguazu has also been converted into a 
mere symbol, since authorities of Evangelical bent have also prohibited Boni Chico from 
making incursions into political affairs.  Therefore, various community authorities are 
now trying to do away with the mburuvichaguazu completely and have proposed a new 
political structure for the CABI (Rocha Torrico 2008, 89).  This shows that the Izoceño-
Guaraní are not only open to changing their system, but specifically they are open to 
eliminating non-democratic elements of the capitanía system and to expanding the use of 
elections to include the position of mburuvichaguazu, a key institution for any 
democracy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 This chapter has provided detailed case studies of two indigenous communities in 
Bolivia: Jesús de Machaca (Aymara) and the Izoceño-Guaraní.  I have used these case 
studies to highlight various features of indigenous political systems that are in tension 
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with liberal democracy or damage the possibility for high quality democracy in these 
communities.  I have argued that in order for indigenous autonomy to be compatible with 
liberal democracy, these features must be modified.  Though the possibility of this 
occurring without major conflict seems feasible for the capitanía system, in Jesús de 
Machaca, this discussion has already provoked a major split between MAS supporters 
and proponents of the usos y costumbres system. 
At their core, the problems that arise from incorporating usos y costumbres 
systems into modern democracy result from the requirement that traditional practices 
(ayni,16 leadership rotation, and others) be placed into a state structure, greatly distorting 
them from their original community context.  According to Bolivian Vice President 
García Linera, usos y costumbres systems “could be articulated within the ‘modern’” 
(cited in Zibechi 2010, 119), including the state and the national democratic system of 
government, but Zibechi (2010, 119) ponders, “would not such a proposal promote the 
subordination of the traditional to the modern?”  In the case of the affirmative, which is 
implied, the result would only be the further marginalization of indigenous peoples by the 
state.  This would be damaging to democracy at both the local and national levels. 
This gets at the heart of the issue.  Usos y costumbres systems cannot be inserted 
as is into a larger democratic system because the former is contentious for the latter and 
vice versa.  In order for the state to recognize indigenous autonomy, indigenous political 
systems must first be tweaked.  However, this process must be approached in a delicate 
manner.  Changes should be born out of serious dialogue between the central government 
and representatives from various indigenous communities, instead of being imposed from                                                         
16 Ayni is a system of mutual aid between families of an ayllu, employed in Aymara communities. 
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above without heeding the observations of indigenous actors.  In the case of the latter, 
alterations to indigenous political systems would represent a disregard for indigenous 
political visions, further marginalizing indigenous peoples, alienating them from 
democratic civil society, and eroding their quality of citizenship.  Unfortunately, in 
Bolivia, this has been the case and the recognition of indigenous autonomy has come to 
represent a renewed imposition of the state upon indigenous peoples due to the process 
the state employed for recognizing indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy.  Principally, it 
has been a top-down process of defining acceptable social, economic, judicial and 
political practices within indigenous communities, without significant input from 
indigenous peoples.  In the following chapter, I will explore the process of granting 
indigenous autonomy in Bolivia.  I will argue that this process silenced indigenous voices 
in defining indigenous autonomy and, therefore, has eliminated any possibility that 
indigenous autonomy in the Bolivian case might serve to deepen democracy by either 
fully incorporating historically marginalized peoples into the state political system or 
making local government more meaningful for indigenous peoples. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DEMOCRATIC ENDS THROUGH NON-DEMOCRATIC MEANS? 
LA LEY MARCO DE AUTONOMÍAS Y DESCENTRALIZACIÓN 
 
 
 
“Todos somos iguales!” 
-Andrés Ibáñez, 1877    
 
In a stroke of irony, the Law of Autonomy ratified by the Bolivian Congress in 
July 2010, is dedicated to the revolutionary Andrés Ibañez who fought for the installation 
of an economic and political structure that would bring Bolivia out of its state of 
inequality and injustice.  He believed in the equality of all Bolivians and the Preamble to 
the Law of Autonomy declares that his fight is “inseparable” from the “process of change 
that ensures... the inclusion and participation of all the diverse parts that constitute us” 
(author’s translation).  However, the law that begins with these words was ratified with 
minimal input from Bolivia’s (arguably) most excluded group, the country’s indigenous 
population, which also happens to be the sector most directly impacted by the law. 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that indigenous political systems are 
incompatible with liberal democracy because they contain non-democratic features or 
elements.  As a result, indigenous autonomy will not deepen democracy in Bolivia.  In 
order for this reform to improve the quality of democracy in the country, several 
fundamental elements of indigenous political systems would need to change.  In this 
chapter, I argue that, in addition to the inherent tensions between indigenous rule and 
Western-style democracy, the processes of ratification and implementation of indigenous 
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autonomy in Bolivia made its effect on democracy even worse.  The top-down process of 
defining and implementing indigenous autonomy in Bolivia excluded indigenous voices 
to the extent that the process was alienating rather than inclusive of indigenous peoples.  
Moreover, the definition of indigenous autonomy that emerged is in stark opposition to 
those envisioned by indigenous communities and organizations.  As a consequence, the 
local political systems that result from this process will seem foreign and imposed, rather 
than natural systems stemming from communal consensus.  The process of implementing 
indigenous autonomy in Bolivia has compounded one of the greatest pre-existing 
problems faced by Bolivian democracy: the incomplete inclusion of indigenous peoples 
into the national political system. 
I will begin by outlining the details of the Law of Autonomy, highlighting 
specifically the most contentious articles for indigenous communities and organizations.  
Then, I will discuss the way in which this controversial law was developed and ratified, 
largely without indigenous input, and the implications of this exclusionary policymaking 
process.  I also examine the conflicts that arose between indigenous groups and the 
central government surrounding the details of the Law of Autonomy.  Ultimately, I argue 
that due to the exclusionary way in which the Law of Autonomy was defined and 
implemented and due to indigenous groups’ ensuing rejection of the Law, indigenous 
autonomy is unlikely to improve the quality of national-level democracy in Bolivia or to 
make local-level democracy more meaningful.  To the contrary, the process of 
implementation has more likely had a negative impact on the quality of democracy in 
Bolivia since it reinforced the political exclusion of indigenous peoples in a highly 
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publicized way and caused citizens to question the democratic legitimacy of their 
president. 
 
Content of the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization 
 
Though the Constitution makes sweeping statements that define indigenous 
autonomy broadly and seems to grant generous rights of self-government to indigenous 
peoples, the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization puts greater demands on 
indigenous political systems for change and is much more limiting with respect to the 
freedoms of indigenous communities.  Although it is necessary for indigenous political 
systems to change in order to become more democratic, this change must be impelled 
from below.  If they are simply imposed from above, without compromise or agreement 
with affected indigenous groups, these changes will likely meet with resistance at the 
local level.  Below, I outline some of the more controversial articles of the Law of 
Autonomies.  Some of these articles partially incorporate the observations of indigenous 
groups.  In others, there is a clear eschewal of indigenous input. 
The Law applies not only to indigenous autonomies, but also to departmental, 
municipal and regional autonomies.  However, a large proportion of the document is 
dedicated to defining the rights and limitations of indigenous autonomy.  After a general 
introduction (Art. 1-29), departmental (Art. 30-32), municipal (Art. 33-36) and regional 
autonomy (Art. 37-41) are briefly outlined.  Then Articles 42 through 48 focus on 
indigenous autonomy.  The remainder of the Law defines the specifics of declaring 
autonomy, the rights an autonomy enjoys, the responsibilities an autonomy must assume, 
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the provision of economic resources, the relationship between an autonomy and the state, 
the creation of mechanisms of social control, and the suspension of corrupt authorities. 
According to the Law of Autonomy, indigenous communities may declare 
indigenous autonomy at the territorial level of TCO (First Peoples’ Communal Territory), 
municipality or indigenous region (Art. 44).  However, autonomous regions are not 
granted legislative powers by the Law.  Originally, the Law did not allow for TCOs to 
convert to indigenous autonomies.  The state-defined territory within which a TCO lay 
(most likely a municipality) would have to declare indigenous autonomy for a TCO to 
enjoy the benefits of this status.  After protest by CIDOB, TCOs were included as eligible 
territories.  However, the Law demands that TCOs have a population of at least 10,000 in 
the highlands and 1,000 in the lowlands to become indigenous autonomies (Art. 58).  
This has already negatively impacted 85 recently titled TCOs in Potosí that have too few 
inhabitants to declare autonomy (Fundación Tierra 2010).  As I will discuss in greater 
detail later, population restrictions were fiercely contested by indigenous opposition since 
many TCOs in eastern Bolivia have small populations,17 but the MAS party refused to 
eliminate these limitations from the Law. 
Once a territory or community decides that it wishes to declare indigenous 
autonomy, it must draft a statute of autonomy and then approve it through popular 
referendum.  The exception to this rule is in TCOs, where statutes can be approved 
through customary procedures, such as in an open assembly.  This exception was 
conceded after much debate between CIDOB protesters and government officials, since 
TCO status represents prior intention by the community to adhere to indigenous                                                         
17 Some TCOs in the department of Santa Cruz have as few as 100 inhabitants. 
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practices, such as communal landholding.  Communities wishing to become indigenous 
autonomies must then certify the ancestral lands they currently occupy, they must 
guarantee that their system of governance is viable, and they must present administrative 
and financial systems for their territory (Art. 56). 
Indigenous autonomies may modify current municipal limits under certain 
conditions to recover ancestral lands or to include within the indigenous autonomy 
ancestral lands lying outside of the territorial jurisdiction defined by the state.  However, 
the larger territory to be created must have a minimum demographic base of 10,000 
inhabitants (Art. 15).  In the case of indigenous communities that cross departmental 
boundaries, both communities must first obtain status as Indigenous First Peoples Peasant 
Territories (Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos, TIOC), a newly created 
territorial distinction.18  Then, as TIOCs the communities must individually declare 
indigenous autonomy (issues of population size in a divided community instantly become 
obvious) and, finally, the two indigenous autonomies may form a mancomunidad 
(commonwealth), whereby they maintain their administrative and demographic unity 
(Art. 29).  The Law becomes so complicated on this matter that the reality of 
communities being divided along state-defined boundary lines will become problematic 
for indigenous autonomy. 
The most controversial section of the Law allows for the suspension of elected 
authorities following a formal accusation by the Public Prosecutor (Art. 144).  While Evo 
Morales himself has adamantly upheld this section of the Law, the governor of Tarija has 
gone so far as to propose a repeal of this stipulation in the Law of Democratic Guarantees                                                         
18 This status is a newer version of TCO status.  The main difference is in terminology, which the MAS 
party felt was more politically correct. 
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(Ley de Garantías Democráticas), which he presented as a citizens’ petition in September 
of 2010 (El Diario 2010).  Notably, the possible suspension of authorities provoked 
outcries from all sides, both before and after the Law of Autonomy was ratified.  This is 
because this capability represents not only the possibility of the central government to 
breach the sovereignty of autonomous sociopolitical units but also the possibility of non-
democratic intervention within the political affairs of the autonomies, which could lead to 
democratic breakdown in affected communities. 
 
Ratification of the Framework Law of Autonomy and Decentralization 
 
 How was it possible for the national government to produce and ratify such a 
polemic piece of legislation?  The ratification of the Law of Autonomy was democratic in 
technical terms.  It was drafted and passed by the national Congress in a two-thirds 
majority vote.  However, the Congress has limited indigenous representation, while 
indigenous peoples were disproportionately impacted by this law.  In Bolivia, the Senate 
is composed of 36 senators, four representing each of Bolivia’s nine departments.  
Currently, 26 senators belong to the MAS party, giving MAS the necessary two-thirds 
majority to pass any legislature unopposed in the Senate.19  The House of Representatives 
is composed of 130 representatives.  Seven slots are reserved specifically for indigenous 
                                                        
19 While MAS purports to represent indigenous interests, within Bolivia’s indigenous communities, 
agreement with this claim is limited mostly to a single faction within Aymara communities.  Evo Morales’ 
strongest support base continues to be the campesinos and the urban poor, many of which do identify as 
indigenous but are not associated with any indigenous community with a defined territorial and social 
organization, such as the inhabitants of Bolivia’s TCOs or indigenous municipalities are. 
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representatives.20  In addition to these seven positions,21 the MAS party holds 82 seats in 
the House, again giving Morales’ party the two-thirds majority necessary to pass any 
piece of legislation unopposed.  Therefore, MAS is able to pass legislation without 
having to compromise with the opposition. 
During the ratification of the Law of Autonomy, six of the seven indigenous 
representatives withheld their support due to the central government’s refusal to attend to 
the demands and suggestions made by the indigenous organizations (La Razón 2010b).  
However, ultimately, indigenous groups did not have the necessary presence in the 
Congress to effectively oppose proposals by the MAS party. 
 In the process of ratifying indigenous autonomy, indigenous peoples were denied 
any expanded formal participation.  Their only input came from what little influence the 
indigenous representatives had on the Congress and organized protests that drew 
attention from the central government.  However, these protests were only marginally 
successful in convincing MAS to incorporate indigenous demands into the Law.  Instead 
of making a genuine effort to address indigenous demands made through CIDOB, the 
central government (specifically President Morales and Vice-president García) implicated 
the group with USAID and the right-wing opposition, undermining the legitimacy of the 
protest. 
Moreover, when the central government agreed to meet with the leaders of 
CIDOB, the purpose seemed to be more to dissuade the march, rather than to reach 
compromises with the indigenous representatives.  CIDOB’s María Sarabia claimed that,                                                         
20 A main argument by Bolivia’s indigenous communities is that they are entitled to more seats in the 
House.  Conflict has arisen between indigenous communities because there are far fewer seats available 
than indigenous communities wishing to be represented.  Indigenous representatives have demanded 18 
seats, but MAS has refused these demands (La Razón 2010f). 
21 All seven indigenous seats are also represented by the MAS party. 
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during one meeting between her organization and representatives of the central 
government, “[t]he whole time they [the government officials] were telling us not to 
march” (quoted in La Razón 2010e).  Ultimately, dialogue between the two sides broke 
down and the Law of Autonomy was passed without agreement between the two sides.  
One leader of CIDOB, Johnny Rojas, remarked as he returned home after the 
organization’s momentous march was finally called off, “[W]e are aware that you cannot 
always win and we are going to complain to the whole world that, as indigenous citizens, 
we are not attended to, in spite of having an indigenous government” (quoted in La Razón 
2010d).  As a result of the lack of agreement between the two sides, the Law has been 
unsatisfactory for many indigenous groups, who feel that their visions of indigenous 
autonomy have been perverted by the state and, more specifically, the MAS party.   
 
Indigenous Backlash 
 
Many articles in the Law of Autonomy were unpopular amongst indigenous 
peoples and, because they were unable to communicate their discontent through formal 
channels (such as in the Congress), they turned to organized protest, culminating in the 
Septima March Indígena por el Territorio, la Autonomía y la Defensa de los Derechos de 
los Pueblos Indígenas (Seventh Indigenous March for Territory, Autonomy and Defense 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).  Organized by CIDOB, the march began in Trinidad 
(in eastern Bolivia) on June 21, 2010, with the intention of arriving to La Paz on foot, in 
an act of protest against the Law of Autonomy.  As 1,000 marchers progressed across the 
department of Santa Cruz, many were hospitalized due to exposure to the elements.  
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Furthermore, cocaleros in the Chapare region (lying between Santa Cruz and La Paz) 
threatened to violently halt the march before it could reach the capital (La Razón 2010a).  
As the scene became more dramatic, the central government agreed to negotiations with 
the protesters.  However, talks caused a divide between the indigenous organizations 
involved in the march, specifically the APG and CIDOB, and the march concluded on 
July 23, 2010 without having obtained several of its objectives. 
The indigenous platform of demands contained 16 points, divided into 6 
categories: land, indigenous autonomy, right to consultation, productive development, 
legislative development, and political participation and representation (Sotomayor 
Cuéllar, 2010).  Amongst their demands within the category of indigenous autonomy 
CIDOB demanded that autonomy statutes be approved using the customary methods of 
each community.  While the government agreed to recognize this form of approval in 
TCOs, municipalities that wish to convert to indigenous autonomy must do so through 
popular referendum, which is seen as a state imposed form of decision-making. 
Another demand made by CIDOB, and of special interest to this chapter, would 
require that the central government include the representative organizations of indigenous 
peoples in the elaboration process of the Law of Autonomy (CIDOB 2010b, 3).  Prior to 
drafting a final version of the Law, several draft bills were presented before the Congress.  
CIDOB demanded that indigenous groups should be consulted and given revisionary 
power over these bills before they were brought before the country’s legislative organ.  
On this point, CIDOB cites the Constitution, which states that indigenous peoples have 
the right “to be consulted by appropriate procedures, and in particular through their 
institutions, in anticipation of any legislative or administrative measures likely to affect 
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them” (Art. 30.2.15).  This demand is especially important because it was never fulfilled 
by the central government and it is the principal reason why indigenous autonomy in 
Bolivia has merely served to further alienate indigenous peoples from the central state 
apparatus. 
Additionally, CIDOB demanded that that the government respect indigenous 
autonomy and refrain from intervening in the fundamental structures of the indigenous 
peoples and in their representative regional organizations, such as CIDOB itself (CIDOB 
2010b, 3).  This is a power that the government has maintained, ignoring CIDOB’s 
wishes.  Because the government has the power to audit and suspend autonomous 
indigenous authorities, thereby annulling the decisions of the community, indigenous 
autonomy becomes more or less meaningless.  Many groups have argued that this right 
will allow the central government, more specifically the MAS party, to censor its 
opposition within indigenous communities (La Razón 2010c).  On the other hand, Sabino 
Mendoza from the Ministry of Autonomies reflected the general MAS position on the 
suspension of autonomous authorities when he informed me that indigenous leaders who 
were fighting against this section of the Law of Autonomy were corrupt and sought to 
concentrate their power within the communities (personal interview, La Paz, 10 August 
2010).  However, a more transparent method of suspending authorities would be through 
local proceedings.  In other words, community members would be responsible for 
denouncing corruption, and civilian committees would determine guilt and punishment, 
rather than having an organ created by the central government hold jurisdiction for such 
affairs. 
CIDOB also wanted indigenous autonomy to be applied without regard for 
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existing municipal and departmental boundaries (BBC Monitoring Americas 2010).  
Though the Law of Autonomy was later altered to address this issue vaguely, the ability 
of indigenous communities to maintain territorial and demographic unity still relies on 
state bureaucracy and the authority of the central government.  The government may have 
been hesistant to allow indigenous autonomies to transcend state-imposed territorial 
boundaries due to the risk that indigenous autonomies might amass power exceeding that 
of the central government.  One government employee suggested to me in an interview 
on July 5, 2010 that the government was trying to combat eastern departments’ demands 
for autonomy by granting regional, municipal and indigenous autonomy as well, an 
argument that has been upheld by the media (see BBC Monitoring Americas 2010, for 
example).  This would result in autonomies within autonomies, effectively undermining 
departmental sovereignty.  If this allegation is true, it makes sense that the central 
government would be averse to allowing indigenous autonomies to transcend state-
defined territorial limits.  In this light, indigenous autonomy represents a way for the 
central government to curb competing sources of power that threaten its authority in 
important matters.  If MAS surrendered to pressures of indigenous groups on this point 
then, the state’s plan for autonomies could potentially backfire. 
Ulterior motives on the part of the MAS party (i.e., the desire to maintain control 
in the face of challenges from sub-national government actors) may also explain the 
state’s general disregard for incorporating indigenous opinion into the Law of Autonomy.  
If the central government had been genuinely concerned about indigenous demands it 
should have ensured proper representation of indigenous groups in the drafting of the 
Law of Autonomy, at least with regard to the sections dealing specifically with the rights 
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and limitations of indigenous autonomy.  For instance, using the Constitutional Assembly 
as an example, the state could have called for the creation of a special committee 
composed of indigenous representatives selected through the principal indigenous 
organizations of the country, such as CIDOB and CONAMAQ, to draft a section of the 
Law of Autonomy referring to indigenous autonomy.  However, the government did not 
take proper steps to uphold indigenous peoples’ constitutional right to prior consultation 
on matters affecting them. 
This has led the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (Consejo 
Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, CONAMAQ), representing the greater part 
of Bolivia’s highland indigenous peoples, and CIDOB, representing Bolivia’s lowland 
indigenous groups, to declare unanimously that the Morales regime used the promise of 
indigenous autonomy as a political banner, while it has no intention of granting 
indigenous communities full autonomy.  Moreover, the two organizations accuse MAS of 
even working to obstruct indigenous communities from gaining autonomy (Erbol 2011).  
Political analyst Ricardo Paz supports the notion that the government’s promise of 
indigenous autonomy had electoral ends (BBC Monitoring Americas 2010).  The 
government proposed the idea of indigenous autonomy shortly before the most recent 
presidential elections in December of 2009.  Therefore, there has been widespread 
speculation that the suggestion was aimed at winning votes and the central government 
now wishes to renege on its promise, seeing that its power might be threatened by the 
presence of full autonomies. 
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Possible Democratic Outcomes 
 
In the worst-case scenario, indigenous autonomy will result as harmful to 
democracy.  Indigenous voices were excluded, with intense media coverage, from the 
process of drafting and ratifying the Law of Autonomy.  Thus, from the start, the process 
of defining and legalizing indigenous autonomy has reinforced indigenous 
marginalization within Bolivia’s political system.  Indigenous peoples may now feel 
more alienated from the central government than before, which could lead to 
disillusionment with the democratic system and withdrawal from public life.  This could 
be lethal for democracy since participation is “the hallmark of active citizenship, which in 
turn [is] required for democracy’s success and extension” (Hagopian 2007, 38). 
Francis Hagopian (2007, 38) labels “the oversupply of ‘passive citizens’” as a key 
problem in Latin America.  However, this has not traditionally been a problem for 
Bolivia, where the citizenry is actively involved in civil society.  According to the 2010 
round of AmericasBarometer22 surveys, Bolivia boasts some of the highest levels of civic 
participation in the region.  Bolivia has the fourth highest score of countries surveyed in 
the Americas in terms of participation in parents’ associations and community 
improvement groups.  It falls second in participation in professional associations and 
third in participation in women’s’ organizations.  Moreover, Bolivia had the fourth 
highest voter turnout rate for the previous presidential elections at 89.4 percent (Seligson 
and Smith 2010).  Therefore, Bolivia does not suffered from passive citizens.  Rather, as 
Hagopian (2007, 41) points out, Bolivia has suffered from “a lack of connection between                                                         
22 The AmericasBarometer is a project that is designed and executed by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). 
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well-organized civic associations and political institutions.”  One example of this is 
indigenous peoples’ intense participation in unofficial indigenous political systems or 
indigenous organizations like CIDOB, which until now have been disconnected from 
state-recognized political institutions.  Granting indigenous communities autonomy is one 
way of connecting indigenous, local-level politics with the national-level system.  
However, if this results in the disillusionment of indigenous citizens and their withdrawal 
from public life, then Bolivia has simply traded one problem for another. 
Finally, as I earlier, Van Cott (2008) argues that top-down processes of 
decentralization are ineffective in deepening democracy.  In Bolivia, the implementation 
of indigenous autonomy is clearly a top-down process and the local political systems that 
result are unlikely to be viewed as organic, communal systems, since they will be an 
altered version of what has traditionally been viewed as legitimate.  Since indigenous 
autonomy is so new to Bolivia, it is impossible to verify what impact it has had on 
national level-democracy or what indigenous peoples’ reactions have been to the ensuing 
local political systems in their communities.  However, given the strong reaction of 
Bolivia’s indigenous groups against the initial Law and its limitations on autonomy, it is 
probable that indigenous peoples will be unhappy with the changes that occur in their 
customary indigenous systems. 
If indigenous communities feel that their new communal political systems are 
foreign, and not a continuation of the systems they have fought to adapt and maintain for 
centuries, if they feel that the changes are imposed rather than born out the realities of the 
communities and the desires of its members, they will not view the reformed systems as 
legitimate sources of authority.  Participation will likely decrease at the local level, since 
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community members in indigenous autonomies will not feel inclined to participate in a 
system they view as illegitimate.  As a result, these communities will become further 
disenfranchised and continue to be estranged from the state political system.  Without 
local channels for articulating their demands, indigenous peoples will find themselves in 
a perpetual state of political marginalization.  In this case, possibilities for improving 
Bolivian democracy will be bleak. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 This final chapter has examined the process by which indigenous autonomy was 
defined and implemented in the Law of Autonomy.  While the process through which the 
Law was drafted and ratified was democratic, it failed to give sufficient influence over 
the Law’s content to the sector of Bolivian society most impacted by it, indigenous 
peoples.  By ignoring indigenous voices, the MAS party reinforced the political exclusion 
of the country’s indigenous peoples, which has historically been a problem for 
democracy in Bolivia.  Moreover, indigenous groups expressed intense dissatisfaction 
with the content of the Law.  The limitations externally imposed upon indigenous 
autonomy will likely render indigenous political systems illegitimate and unfamiliar in 
the eyes of community members.  The eventual outcome might even be a decrease in 
democratic quality in Bolivia as indigenous peoples disengage from their local political 
systems and become embittered with the state democratic system, which clearly failed 
them in the case of indigenous autonomy. 
  92 
 Indigenous autonomy presented the central government with the opportunity to 
incorporate indigenous peoples as major players in state policymaking and, thus, create 
an equalizing power shift in the country’s democracy.  If the government had taken a 
different approach in defining and implementing indigenous autonomy, giving greater 
voice to indigenous peoples, this would have constituted a major step in including a 
historically marginalized people in the national political process in a real way.  Moreover, 
by creating a space for negotiation and compromise, reasonable changes to indigenous 
political systems may have been conceived and applied in a natural, non-intrusive way. 
However, the central government (dominated by the MAS party) failed to do so 
and indigenous representatives were ignored instead.  Thus, the process toward 
indigenous autonomy has become one more example, further proof, of the indigenous 
population’s perpetual exclusion from the nation and democracy.  Ultimately, indigenous 
autonomy has not improved democracy in Bolivia at the local or national level.  Rather, it 
has served to reinforce problems of Bolivian democracy and caused indigenous citizens, 
if not citizens generally, to question the democratic legitimacy of the president and the 
leading MAS party. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have argued that indigenous autonomy has failed to deepen 
democracy in Bolivia because of inherent tensions between indigenous political systems 
and liberal democracy, and due to the top-down manner in which this reform was 
introduced.  I defined indigenous autonomy as the formal recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ right to freely determine their political, economic, social and cultural norms and 
institutions, processes of development, and systems of justice at the community level 
within their defined territories and when not in violation of the laws of the national 
government.  In Bolivia, this has translated to special rights to land, autonomous political 
systems, culturally appropriate mechanisms of social control, and control over natural 
and economic resources.  Though demands for indigenous autonomy have come from 
below, in Bolivia, the concept of indigenous autonomy was formed primarily by 
intellectuals, many of which are now government officials under the MAS party and took 
part in formalizing this concept. 
I then moved on to a discussion of arguments by scholars that indigenous 
autonomy aids in deepening democracy.  I refuted these claims, especially in the Bolivian 
case.  With the support of a series of scholarly counterarguments, I argued that 
indigenous political systems at their core are at odds with liberal democracy, which I 
defined using the basic conditions outlined by Dahl (1989).  Moreover, I pose that, in 
Bolivia, the top-down approach to implementing indigenous autonomy has undermined 
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the ability of this process to deepen democracy. 
I next offered specific examples of the tensions between indigenous political 
systems and liberal democracy using the usos y costumbres system of Jesús de Machaca 
and the capitanía system of the Izoceño-Guaraní.  Moreover, because indigenous 
political systems in many ways are incompatible with the larger democratic system of the 
Bolivian state, certain features of indigenous political systems must be modified.  
However, these modifications must be agreed upon in a process of dialogue between the 
state and indigenous communities.  If changes are imposed upon indigenous political 
systems from above without regard for indigenous opinions, the effect will be the 
marginalization of indigenous peoples and their alienation from democratic civil society, 
which will be damaging for the quality of democracy in Bolivia. 
In my final chapter, I argued that this worst-case scenario has been realized in 
Bolivia with the implementation of indigenous autonomy.  Since indigenous autonomy 
was theorized and imposed from the top down with minimal indigenous input, it forces 
indigenous peoples to change their political systems in order to conform to the structure 
of the state and state political visions.  This results in the subordination of indigenous 
forms of government to state forms, further marginalizing indigenous peoples, their 
values and ideals.  Unfortunately, this is harmful for the quality of democracy in Bolivia, 
and the country has struggled with the problem of marginalized sectors when trying to 
liberalize its democracy in the past.   
Indigenous autonomy presented a prime opportunity for the central government to 
incorporate indigenous peoples as major players in state policy making, thus, creating an 
equalizing power shift from the political elites to marginalized sectors.  However, the 
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state failed to incorporate indigenous representatives and ignored them instead, in spite of 
attempts by indigenous representative organizations to express indigenous demands and 
opinions.  If the government had taken a different approach in defining and implementing 
indigenous autonomy, giving greater voice to indigenous peoples, this would have 
constituted a major step in including a historically marginalized people in the national 
political process in a real way.  The result may have been a more meaningful democratic 
system at the national level. 
Moreover, by creating a space for negotiation and compromise, reasonable 
changes to indigenous political systems may have been conceived of and applied in an 
organic, non-intrusive way.  Instead, the recognition of indigenous autonomy has had 
quite the opposite effect.  In recognizing indigenous political systems in such a way, the 
government has also stripped indigenous peoples of these systems.  By formalizing such 
systems without input from indigenous citizens, the central government has redefined 
these systems and allowed for greater state control over them.  Furthermore, in distorting 
them, they are no longer the political systems of the country’s indigenous peoples.  The 
great paradox of indigenous autonomy has revealed itself in Bolivia to be that indigenous 
peoples have fought for decades to have their political systems recognized as legitimate 
sources of authority, and now that they have achieved their goal, they have also lost 
control over the definition and functioning of their political systems.  Thus, in gaining 
autonomy in theory, indigenous communities may very well have lost it in actuality. 
Nevertheless, all hope for an improved democratic system in Bolivia is not lost.  
There still exists strong support for democracy by the population and clear policy 
attempts (however unsuccessful they may be) at deepening its democracy.  In the 2010 
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round of AmericasBarometer surveys carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP), Bolivia scored 70.3 points on a 100-point scale of support for 
democracy as the best form of government.  This figure is practically unchanged from the 
2008 round of surveys and places Bolivia in the top third of the 25 countries in the 
Americas surveyed on this measure (Seligson and Smith 2010).  Therefore, there is still 
strong support for democracy in the abstract in spite of the democratic reality in Bolivia.  
Furthermore, decentralizing reforms show a clear attempt to improve the quality of 
democracy in the country.  Indigenous autonomy represents one such reform.  However, 
indigenous autonomy has failed to achieve this effect.  Therefore, other options for 
deepening and liberalizing Bolivian democracy should be explored. 
Bolivia is an ethnically divided nation, so perhaps inducing crosscutting cleavages 
in the population would be helpful for overcoming these divides that Evo Morales is 
currently reinforcing.  Federalism is an idea that has been proposed by several Bolivian 
departments and represents a way of dividing the country along regional lines.  The 
exploitation of natural resources in a way that benefits a community or department is one 
of the principal concerns of both the Media Luna and CIDOB.  This, for example, could 
be a key uniting characteristic of the inhabitants of Bolivia’s eastern departments, 
indigenous and non-indigenous alike.  Instead of recreating itself as a plurinational state, 
Bolivia could reinvent itself as a federalist state, much like the U.S.  This could 
potentially effect the same decentralization that the central government was trying to 
achieve with the formalization of indigenous autonomies, deepening democracy without 
fragmenting the nation along ethnic lines. 
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Ultimately, the equitable inclusion of all sectors of Bolivian society into the 
democratic system is vital to deepening democracy in the country.  Opportunities for 
incorporating the marginalized indigenous population into the state system or for 
promoting this sector’s formal participation in the local- and national-level political 
systems must be further explored by scholars and government officials.  Though 
indigenous autonomy appeared to be a promising reform that might provoke such 
incorporation, it has failed to do so in Bolivia.  Unfortunately, indigenous autonomy—
although it undeniably has value in other realms (specifically in terms of cultural 
preservation and respect for human rights)—is not the answer for improving the quality 
of democracy in Bolivia. 
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